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In Re No. 80-100 Board of Education of teh Hendrick Hudson Central 
the legislative history indicates that a handicapped child should 
receive, not just an adequate education, but one that will enable 
the child to achieve his maximum potential; and (3) compliance with 
a state plan is not itself enough to guarantee compliance with 
federal standards. 
As the discussion below indicates, the decision below 
appears to be wrong. The SG argues against taking the case on the 
~
ground that it will have limited precedential value. Despite the 
CA2's attempts to limit the precedential scope of its decision, I 
think future courts will have trouble seeing the case as irrelevant 
2. 
to cases before them (I will explain this in more detail below) . 
Another reason for not taking the case would be that there is as yet 
no split. In the context of a decision such as this one, however, 
there may be little need to wait for more wrongly-decided cases. I 
would therefore recommend a grant. 
1. FACTS: In the decision below, the CA2 upheld a DC 
decision ordering a school to 
v' 
for a deaf child. In his excellent dissent, 
demonstates that the school made extraordinary efforts to do what 
would be best for the child and only decided against an interprete 
after repeated observations of her classroom behavior when she had 
..___ - ---- -an interpreter: these observations (made by several experts in 
several different classroom situations) revealed that she resisted 
interpretation, watched the speaker rather than the interpreter, and 
asked the speaker to repeat anything she could not understand. A 
specialist in teaching children with hearing impairments, who was 
Amy's language tutor, testified on the basis of working closely with 
Amy daily that a sign language interpreter would not make a 
significant difference in Amy's education but would, on the 
contrary, deter her interactions with her teacher and other children 
in the classroom. This evidence was corrobated by a hearing 
therapist who worked with Amy three times a week for a half-hour 
each session. In light of this evidence, the school district 
concluded that, at least for the time being, she did not need a 
constant interpreter in addition to the many supplemental services 
she was receiving. 
3. 
2. ANALYSIS: The Education for the Handicapped Act, 20 
u.s.c. §§ 1401-1461 provides that cooperating states are to have a 
plan approved (by the Sec'y of HEW) providing free appropriate 
public education to handicapped children. The plan must also 
provide procedures for challenges to the education provided a 
handicapped child, and the final administrative decisions can be 
challenged de novo in DC. 
The DC held that a sign-language interpreter had to be 
~ :::::.:. 
provided. He stated that the Act did not define "appropriate 
education" and concluded that the term meant services necessary "to 
bring her educational opportunity up to the level of the educational 
opportunity being offered to her non-handicapped peers." This, the 
DC decided, meant a sign-language interpreter during all academic 
courses. ~ ....., 
Actually, the act does define "free appropriate public~ 
education": special education and related servies at public ___., ---expense, under public supervision and direction, including an 
appropriate preschool, elementary, or secondary school education in 
the State and in conformity with the individualized education 
program required by the federal law. This definition suggests that 
whether a child has been deprived of his rights under an approved 
plan will turn on whether he has recieved the free public education 
he was entitled to under the relevant approved state plan (providing 
the other requirements are met, such as the "individualized-program" 
requirement) . 





Under the approved New York plan, all children with ~ 
hearing losses such as Amy's are not automatically entitled to 2 1}{, ,L( .. ·~ 
sign-language interpreter. ~ 
The CA2 (Timbers and Bonsal, per curiam) affirmed over 
Judge Mansfield's powerfu~ dj ssent. The decision, which begins with --- ~ 
the sentence "This case is about Amy," is somewhat light on 
reasoning. The court agreed that Amy needed an interpreter and _________, 
affirmed the legal standard adopted by the DC: the Act requires 
~· .... ...___...._ 
that level of services needed to bring her educational opportunity 
up to the level offered non-handicapped children. The CA2 did not 
provide any basis for the legal conclusion (other than incorporation 
by reference of the rationale below) and stated that the evidence 
did not show that the factual findings were clearly erroneous. In 
th~ last paragraph, it states that the holding is narrow and rests 
on the concerns involved in a particular child, her atypical family 
(her parents were deaf), etc., concluding with: "In short, our 
decision is limited to the unique facts of this case and is not 
intended as authority beyond this case." 
I do not see how a purely legal holding as to the proper 
standard (compliance with an approved state plan versus services 
necessary to provide an educational opportunity equivalent to that 
available to other children) can be distinguished in future cases on 
the ground that Amy and her family are unique. Nor do I see how 
·~IL :\- /._J 
petr can avoid giving an interpreter to every child with a hearing ~- -------.._ -..... -
loss regardless of the child's needs, the marginal utility of the 
service, and the great cost. Given the overwhelming evidence that 
., . 
5. 
the an interpreter was actually undersirable in this case, few cases 
will be distinguishable on the basis of these facts. 
In dissent, Judge Mansfield gives other reasons for 
regarding the decisions below as wrong. For example, he explains 
that evaluating a child's learning potential is an almost 
impossible, and certainly controversial, task--whereas the 
legislative history indicates that Congress intended to give 
children the education they need to become independent, productive 
members of society. Amy is performing above average in her class 
and appears to be on her way to being an independent person, capable 
of functioning without a constant interpreter. 
Another problem with the majority opinion is noted by the 
pool memo: under it, states cannot establish a plan, get it 
approved, and thereby know what expenses they will incurr if they 
receive federal funds under this voluntary cooperative program. 
; 
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PRELIMINARY MEMORANDUM 
February 20, 1981 Conference 
List 5, Sheet 3 
No. 80-1002 
BOARD OF EDUCATION, ET AL.~ 
v. 
Cert to CA 2 
{Timbers, Bonsal, D.J.; 
Mansfield dissenting) 
{Per Curiam) 
ROWLEY Federal/Civil Timely 
1. SUMMARY: Petrs contend that the CA and DC erred in 
requiring them to provide a partially deaf s tudent with a sign -----language interpreter under the Education fo r All Handicapped 
~ . 
Children Act of 1975, 20 U.S.C. §1401 et ~· {1978). 
2. 
child. 
FACTS: Amy Rowley is an eight yea r old partially deaf 
Despite her handicap, she performs a bove the median 
B~.$e.. -1-h 1$ ~t!. pr-j,...__tly t.$ ~""''~""" /,15 
~IY/ .::~,t ~/./ .le.... de.rr,~ I be.-/,~7 h--.Jt!!!!..c..--'~ ~ 
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standard of her class. She has some residual hearing, 
particularly in lower frequencies, and can read lips. She also 
uses an FM wireless hearing aid, which amplifies particular 
sounds but blocks out background noise. The school district 
II ' l ---....::1 
provided Amy with a sign interpreter on a test basis, but the 
interpreter reported that Amy resisted interpretation, 
functioning like the nonhandicapped children and looking to the 
teacher rather than the interpreter. The Education for All 
Handicapped Children Act of 1975, 20 u.s.c. §l414(a) (5) provides 
that "the local educational agency •.. will establish ... an 
individualized education program for each handicapped child at 
the beginning of each school year •... " Amy's parents objected 
to the individualized program prepared by the school district for 
Amy because it made no provision for a sign language interpreter. 
The school district's decision was upheld by the Commissioner of 
Education of New York, and the Rowleys commenced an action in the 
Southern District of New York to compel the assignment of an 
interpreter. Prior to making the state commissioner a defendant, 
the parties stipulated that the DC should review Amy's program 
not only for the current year but the next year as well. The 
Rowleys contended that without assignment of an interpreter Amy 
was deprived of the "free appropriate public education" which the 
Act required state and local educational agencies receiving funds 
under it to provide each handicapped child. Section 1412(1) of 
the Act provides: "In order to qualify for assistance under this 
subchapter in any fiscal year, a S~ate shall demonstrate to the 
Commissioner that the following conditions are met: {1) The State 
- 3 -
r. has in effect a policy that assures all handicapped children the 
right to a free appropriate public education." 
( 
v . 
3. DECISIONS BELOW: The DC (Broder1ck) ruled that a "free 
appropriate public education" required "that each handicapped 
child be given an opportunity to achieve his full potential 
commensurate with the opportunity provided to other children". 
He concluded that without a sign interpreter Amy missed much of 
what went on in the classroom, and concluded that the services of 
an interpreter were needed "to bring her educational opportunity 
up to the level of the educational opportunity being offered to 
her non-handicapped peers." The CA concluded in a brief opinion 
that the DC's decision was ba~ed "on the preponderance of the ---------------...:=-- --7 
evidence", §1415(e) (2). The majority went out of its way to 
emphasize the narrow scope of its holding. It stated "our 
decision is limited to the unique facts of this case and is not 
intended as authority beyond this case. II 
Judge Mansfield dissented. He criticized the ...thf6 DC' s view 
that the Act did not define "free appropriate public education." 
20 u.s.c. §1412(18) defines "free appropriate public education" 
as "special education and related services which (A) have been 
provided at public expense, under public supervision and 
direction, and without charge, (B) meet the standards of the 
state educational agency, (C) include an appropriate preschool 
elementary or secondary school education in the state involved, 
and (D) are provided in conformity with the individualized 
education program required under ·§1414 (a) (5) of this title." A 
"special education" is defined in §1401(16) as specially designed 
-instruction to meet the "unique needs of a handicapped child," 
and "related services" is defined in §1401(17) as 
· "transportation, and such developmental corrective, and other 
supportive services (including speech pathology and audiology, 
psychological services, physical and occupational therapy, 
recreation, and medical and counselling services, except that 
such medical services shall be for diagnostic and evaluation 
purposes only) as may be required to assist a hand icapped child 
to benefit from special education". According to the dissent, 
the prima r y characteristics of the definition are thus meeting 
the standards of an approved state plan and tailoring education 
to the specific needs of the individual. Here New York has 
adopted a state plan which has been approved by the U.S. 
Education Commissioner, a plan which permits development of 
unique educational plans for handicapped children like Amy. The 
plan does not require sign intepreters. Reviewing the facts, 
Judge Ma nsfield concluded that the evidence clearly demonstrated 
that Amy's unique needs did not require the use of a sign · 
language interpreter. The DC simply concluded that every deaf 
child fairs better in class with an interpreter, and moved from 
this conclusion to Amy's case. 
4. CONTENTIONS: The state education authorities begin by 
adopting Judge Mansfield's argument that the DC erred in 
substituting its own definition of free appropriate public 
education for the definitions provided in the Act. They contend 
that the Act was intended to enable the hand icapped to become 




conditions allow. Its purpose was not, as the DC ruled, to 
. compel school districts to provide the handicapped with the 
opportunity to achieve maximum or a full potential, however 
desirable that goal may be. Petrs also stress that the CA should 
have ordered dismissal of the complaint because the school 
district was in conformity with the state plan approved by the 
federal Commissioner.. Under the Act appropriate education is 
defined by reference to approved state plans, and New York's plan 
did not require assignment of interpreters. Petrs also contend 
that the DC based its decision on the perceived needs of a class 
of handicapped persons, rather than the unique needs of an 
individual as required by the Act. See 20 u.s.c. §1401(16). 
Petrs then review the testimony developed below that Amy 
functions perfectly well in class without a sign interpreter, 
that the existence of an interpreter would actually impede Amy's 
development, and injure her prospects for later life when such an 
interpreter would not always be available. Petrs also contend 
that the CA and DC erred in hearing the case since it concerned 
not only the plan for the current school year, developed by the 
school district, but also Amy's plan for the corning school year, 
not yet addressed by state authorities. Finally, petrs 
emphasized that the CA's effort to limit the precedential value 
of its decision should not bar review by ceriorari. The 
definition of free appropriate public education advanced by the 
DC has already been cited by several other courts in cases 
arising under the Act. See, e.g., · Battle v. Commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania, 629 F.2d 269 (CA 3 1980). 
·. 
- 6 -
Resps stress that there is no conflict in the circuits and 
· that the case, as the CA itself stressed, is highly fact 
specific. They argue that the definition in the Act relied upon 
by Judge Mansfield and petrs is not a functional definition, and 
that it provides no guidance to judges in their consideration of 
controversies involving the identification, evaluation, or 
educational placement of the child or the provision of a free 
appropriate public education. The DC therefore did not err in 
adopting the definition that it did. Resps also reject the 
exhaustion argument raised by petrs, since any approach other 
than the D·c' s would not have permit ted resolution of the issue 
prior to the school year conce~ned. 
5. DISCUSSION: I find the dissent's argument concerning 
the definition of a free appropriate public education persuasive. 
The Act defines the term by reference to an approved state plan, 
and here New York's approved state plan did not require a sign 
interpreter. By submitting a plan and gaining its approval, New 
York officials were in a position to know what obligations they 
were incurring in exchange for acceptance of federal funds. 
Those obligations did not include the amorphous definition of an 
appropriate education adopted by the DC and upheld by the CA. As 
resps point out, however, there is no conflict in the circuits, 
and the CA bent over backwards to make its affirmance fact 
specific. 
There is a response. 
2/5/81 
JBP 
Roberts Op in petn. 
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MICHAEL A. CHATDFF 
ATTORNEY AND COUNSELLOR AT LAW 
27D-31M GRAND CENTRAL PARKWAY 
FLORAL PARK, NEW YORK 11005 
(212l 428·4596 
January ll, 1982 
Supreme Court of the United States 
United States Supreme Court Building 
l First Street, N.E. 
Washington, D.C. 20543 
'·""'·::') I.' 'I ! ~ 
_;,_;:._ L.: •. ' .J PH 12 56 
Re: Board of Education, Hendrick Hudson Central School District v. Rowley , 
Index No. 80-1002. 
Dear Sir: 
The above-entitled action is scheduled to be argued before the Court in Febru-
ary. I am the attorney of record for the respondents and l__:;:i~2 ~e_argt.:_!.I!g be-
fore the Court. .. 1...-~~~-~al}y _ _J;jgaf. The purpose of this letter is to explain to 
you briefly the equipment I would like to use (see the enclosed memorandum pre= 
pared by the College Educational Resources Department of Ga11audet College) and 
Lo ask your permission _for its use. 
There are .only three possible ways to provide a deaf individual with access to 
the spoken word: (1) us~ of a sign language interpreter; (2) use of a note-taker; 
or (3) use of a visual display. I am not nearly competent enough in sigh language 
Lo make use of an interpreter. Even the best note-taker will miss 50 percent 
of what is said in the Court. The system I propose will provide me with "a continuous 
English display of all voice communication in the courtroom." 
If this proposal is feasible, I will be in Washington on February 5 for a demon-
stratiDJ.1 of the system. following the demonstration, Mr. Torr (of Gallaudet College) 
and I could meet with you to discuss questions of set-up, security check, etc. 
If you prefer, a representative from your office could attend the demonstration and 
see the system in actual operation. 






KENDALL GREEN, VVASHINGTDN, D.C. 20002 
RECEiVED 




Don Torr {/J \"""" 
January 4, 1981 
,n1ce of the Vice Presiden· 
MSSDIKDES 
Subject: Michael Chatoff and Real-Time Translation at Supreme Court 
/ 
1 Mr. Donald Nixon, President of Translation Systems, Inc. has 
/·assured me of his readiness to provide equipment and a certified court 
i s te_nog~aph~_r to support Hr. Chat off in his- a-ppeal to the Supreme Co~rt­
in February. On January 8, 1982 Donald Nixon; Kevin Casey, Tom Klagholz, 
Julian Snow, and I will meet to discuss the equipment configuration and 
operation of the system which would give Mr. Chatoff a continuous English 
display of all .voice conununication in the courtroom . As of this moment, 
the project appears completely feasib~~-
Hr. Nixon has suggested that it would perhaps be best if Mr . Chatoff 
were the one who ~e court for pennissi~:m~~_::;e this technology to 
enable him to follow the proceedings of the court with full comprehension. 
The intention would be to place a S~e~.lPe machine ~d a .CRT d~splay in 
the courtroom and place the computer in the hall or some convenient space 
near the courtroom . A cable would be run from the Stenotype machine to 
the ~~r. A second. cable would run~ the computer-to the dispTay 
tenninal. There would be need for access to standard electrical power for 
the Stenotype machine,_ the display tenn:inal, and the computer. It would be 
necessary to have . some _time to set UE._ the system and tes~_J:..E. Uould you please 
pass that suggestion to Mr. Chatoff and ask him to get back to us as soon as 
possible with a reply? I would be happy to communicate directly with 
Mr. Chatoff if you think that would speed things. 
I have suggested to Don Nixon that we demonstrate the system for 
Hr. Chatoff using the equipment which would be installed in the court if 
permission is granted and he has agreed ro that . 
I certainly hope it is possible to provide this support to 
Hr . Chatoff . Jj: wo~ld be an historic event for deaf individuals and would 
~~precedent for this ty~f service; it wouldlundoubtedly--pr;vide the 
public with additional education about deafness; and ~t would probably_ 
accelerate the incorporation of this technology in the court system . 
- - -. 
DVT:psb:l 
cc: D. H. Nixon 
E. c. }lerrill, Jr. 
K. B. Casey 
T. J. Klagholz 
J. B. Snow 
J. c. Scott 
No. 80-1002 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES"S--:::-::::-::----·---
f'ECEJV :D 
October Term, 1980 
( ii~E OF fhf LLER~ 
THE BOARD OF EDUCATIOO OF THE HENDRICK HUDSON '11= ro" 'T, 
CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, WESTCHESTER COUNTY, AND 
THE COMMISSIOOER OF EDUCATION OF THE STATE OF 
NEW YORK, PETITIONERS 
v. 
AWl RCWLEY, ET AL. 
ON PETITIONER FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO 
THE UNTED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE 
SECOND CIRCUIT 
EX PARTE MOTION TO PERMIT INTERPRETATION OF ORAL ARGUMENT 
Counsel for respondents moves, ex parte, pursuant to Rule 42 of the Rules of 
the Supreme Court for permission to have the oral argument before this Court 
interpreted on the grounds that: 
1. Counsel for the respondents, who has conducted this litigation from its in-
ception, is deaf; 
2. · Counsel for the respondents has used various methods in the lower courts to 
provide him with access to oral communications, including note-takers (not very 
useful) and video displays; 
3. Counsel for the respondents seeks permission to use a system, using private 
equipment and facilities, arranged under the supervision of Mr. Donald Torr, 
Department of College Educational Resources, Gallaudet College, and explained more 
fully in this excerpt from an interoffice memorandum prepared by Mr. Torr: 
2 
The intention would be to place a Stenotype machine and a CRT display 
in the courtroom and place the computer in the hall or some convenient space 
near the courtroom. A cable would be run from the Stenotype machine to the 
computer. A second cable would be run from the computer to the display 
terminal. There would be need for access to standard electrical power 
for the Stenotype machine, the display terminal, and the computer. 
4. A stenographer would type the oral argument using stenographic shorthand. 
Everything typed by the stenographer would pass through a computer which would 
convert the stenographic shorthand to written English. The conversion would ap-
pear on the display terminal which would be in front of counsel for respondents. 
The system "would give Mr. Chatoff a continuous English display of all voice com-
munications in the courtroom;" 
5. No record of the argument will be made, written or otherwise. If necessary, 
counsel for respondents, as a member of the Bar of the Supreme Court of the United 
States, will submit to the Office of the Clerk a certification to that effect; 
WHEREFORE, counsel for respondents requests permission for interpretation, 
as discussed above. 
Dated: Floral Park, New York 
January 20, 1982 
Respectfully submitted, 
~d~dL t/ L~/f!Jf/ 
Michael A. Chatoff 
Counsel for Respondents 
270-31M Grand Central Parkway 
Floral Park, New York 11005 
(212) 428-4596 (TTY) 
(516) 248-1900 
OFFICE OF THE CLERK 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
WASHINGTON, D. C., 20543 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
From: Al Stevas ~ 
/~ 
Re: Argument in Board of Education 
Central School District v. Ro 
endrick Huds~ 
e , No. 81-1001_ ) 
/ 
In the above case the Court g nted the pe-tition for 
writ of certiorari on November 2, 1981, a <1 the_ca-se ~~ 
probably be scheduled for argument during the kionth.-of Marc~. 
I am informed that counsel for the respondent is totally deaf. 
He indicates he is not competent enough in sign language to 
make use of an interpreter and will be requesting permission 
to use an official court stenographer whose Stenotype machine 
will be tied to a computer display terminal in the Courtroom 
(the computer equipment would be located outside the Courtroom) . 
This would permit the court reporter to record questions and 
they would be instantly displayed on the terminal so that 
counsel could read the questions and then respond. 
It appears from the attaehea~ondence that the 
attorney is endeavoring cto set a_ precedent..Jby utilizing this 
procedure in the Supreme--ecrtr:r·t, thereby making it easier for 
attorneys to convince other court systems to allow this tech-
nique. 
Since I believe this is a matter that would require 
permission of the Chief Justice and/or the Court, I am calling 
it to your attention in advance of receiving a motion from 
counsel. Efforts to persuade him to have other counsel argue 
the case have not been fruitful. 
We recently had a group of deaf students seated in the 
Courtroom during oral argument and an interpreter was allowed 





' •; .... 
... . ., . 
'''l 
March 18, 1982 
MEMORANDUM TO FERENCE 
Subject: 
Having previously been granted permission 
by the Court, Mi f, arguing for the respondent 
in this case o March 23rd ill use a computer generated 
system in ord to "hear" uestions put to him by the 
Court as well as opposing counsel argument. 
Chatoff is deaf and advises that he is not competent 
enough in sign language . to make use of an interpreter. 
Through the assistance of officials at 
Gallaudet College, Chatoff will use a certified court 
reporter who will key the questions in the standard court 
reporter method into a stenorette machine. This machine 
is wired directly into a small computer which will trans-
late the information into plain English and in turn transmit 
this to a terminal at the arguing attorney lectern. The 
time it takes from stenorette to computer to the terminal 
is about three seconds. Thus it should take only a few 
seconds after a question is asked for Chatoff to respond 
(giving him time to read the question) . 
Chatoff and the assisting group from Gallaudet 
set up the equipment in 'the Courtroom on February 26th. 
The translation during the test was extremely favorable. 
Joseph Karlovitz, the court reporter, had excellent steno-
graphic skills, and he will also be present to assist 
Chatoff during argument. 
When asked how he would know if a question 
was being asked while he was speaking, Chatoff said 
co-counsel would tug his coat and he would then look at 
the terminal and read the question. 
·. 
-2-
From the test it appears that the use of the 
computer equipment will be much faster and more accurate 
than the use of sign language or hand written notes. 
A back-up computer is promised and every 
effort for technical redundancy has been offered. It 
therefore appears that the argument should proceed as 
"normal" as .possible. The Conference however, should be 
aware that Mr. Chatoff has a speech impediment which may 
require close attention for comprehension. 
80-1002 BD. OF EDUCATION v. ROWLEY Argued 3/23/82 
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BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE HENDRICK HUD-
SON CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, WESTCHESTER 
COUNTY, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. AMY ROWLEY, 
!'// ,.. ' BY HER PARENTS AND NATURAL GUARDIANS, ~~
CLIFFORD AND NANCY ROWLEY, ETC. I 
~ ~ ~ ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF s-: / [p . 
!.~ l£...tiv- APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT a ,/~JL.;.~~_L_l-
TCJ [May-, 19821 ~r~- ' 
/,., ~ .. ~ krv ~<-ffl v (....GM.I ~ {)" • JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court. 
~ };1/ This case presents a question of statutory interpretation. ~ 1 C/-- , 
Petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals and the Dis-
~ trict Court misconstrued the requirements imposed by Con- / ( 
r.yvv-,1 } _ _1; A... .. bg gress upon States which receive federal funds under the Edu.ro 4h 6 0 tp'i::( 
~~ cation for All Handicapped Children Act. We agree and~~.-~- 1 # 
reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals. ~r~---
I a-~ 
The Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975/.2.. ~
(Act), 20 U. S. C. § 1401 et seq., provides federal money toR1i;;;;f _ ~- .L. ~ ~- . 
assist state and local agencies in educating handicapped chil-
dren, and conditions such funding upon a State's complianc~ ~ ~ 
with extensive goals and procedures. The Act represents an 
ambitious federal effort to promote the education of hand~-)"_, . 
1 
• . _ _(} 
capped children, and was passed in response to Congres':5'"
perception that a majority of handicapped -children in the ~ 0 · 
United States "were either totally excluded from schools or A!_.~ • .:~ 
[were] sitting idly in regular classrooms awaiting the time~- ---,-0 
when they were old enough to 'drop out."' H.R. Rep. No. ~4/lf/( S 






2 HENDRICK HUDSON DIST. BD. OF ED. v. ROWLEY 
sions shed light on the question of statutory interpretation 
which is at the heart of this case. 
Congress first addressed the problem of educating the 
handicapped in 1966 when it amended the Elementary and 
Secondary Education Act of 1965 to establish a grant pro-
gram "for the purpose of assisting the States in the initiation, 
expansion, and improvement of programs and projects ... 
for the education of handicapped children." Pub. L. No. 
89-750, § 161, 80 Stat. 1204 (1966). That program was re-
pealed in 1970 by the Education for the Handicapped Act, 
Pub. L. No. 91-230, 84 Stat. 175, Part B of which established 
a grant program similar in purpose to the repealed legisla-
tion. Neither the 1966 nor the 1970 legislation contained 
specific guidelines for state use of the grant money; both 
were aimed primarily at stimulating the States to develop 
educational resources and to train personnel for educating 
the handicapped. 1 
Dissatisfied with the progress being made under these ear-
lier enactments, and spurred by two district court decisions 
holding that handicapped children should be given access to a 
public education/ Congress in 1974 greatly increased federal 
funding for education of the handicapped and for the first 
time required recipient States to adopt "a goal of providing 
full educational opportunities to all handicapped children." 
Pub. L. 9~80, 88 Stat. 579, 583 (1974) (the 1974 statute). 
The 1974 statute was recognized as an interim measure only, 
adopted "in order to give the Congress an additional year in 
1 See S. Rep. No. 94-168, p. 5 (1975); H.R. Rep. No. 94-332, pp. 2-3 
(1975). 
2 Two cases, Mills v. Board of Education of the District of Columbia, 
348 F. Supp. 866 (DC 1972), and Pennsylvania Association for Retarded 
Children v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 334 F. Supp. 1257 (1971), 
343 F. Supp. 279 (ED Pa 1972), were later identified as the most prominent 
of the cases contributing to Congress' enactment of the Act and the stat-
utes which preceded it. H.R. Rep. 94-332, supra, at 3-4. Both decisions 
are discussed in Part III of this opinion, infra. 
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which to study what if any additional Federal assistance 
[was] required to enable the States to meet the needs of 
handicapped children." H.R. Rep. No. 94-332, supra, p. 4. 
The ensuing year of study produced the Education for All 
Handicapped Children Act of 1975. 
In order to qualify for federal financial assistance under the 
Act, a State must demonstrate that it "has in effect a policy 
that assures all handicapped children the right to a free aQ-
~ te .J?EQ.lic~du~ion." 20 U. S. C. § 1412(1). That 
po 1cymust be reflected in a state plan submitted to and ap-
proved by the Commissioner of Education, 3 § 1413, which de-
scribes in detail the goals, programs, and timetables under 
which the State intends to educate handicapped children 
within its borders. § 1412, 1413. States receiving money 
under the Act must provide education to the handicapped by 
priority, first "to handicapped children who are not receiving 
an education" and second to handicapped children . . . with 
the most severe handicaps who are receiving an inadequate 
education," § 1412(3), and "to the maximum extent appropri-
ate" must educate handicapped children "with children who 
are not handicapped." § 1412(5). 4 The Act broadly defines 
"handicapped children" to include "mentally retarded, hard of 
hearing, deaf, speech impaired, visually handicapped, seri-
3 All functions of the Commissioner of Education, formerly an officer in 
the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, were transferred to 
the Secretary of Education in 1979 when Congress passed the Department 
of Education Organization Act, 20 U. S. C. § 3401 et seq. See 20 U. S. C. 
§ 3441(a)(1). 
• Despite this preference for "mainstreaming" handicapped children-
educating them with nonhandicapped children-Congress recognized that 
regular classrooms simply would not be a suitable setting for the education 
of many handicapped children. The Act expressly acknowledges that "the 
nature or severity of the handicap [may be] such that education in regular 
classes with the use of supplementary aids and services cannot be achieved 
satisfactorily." § 1412(5). The Act thus provides for the education of 
some handicapped children in separate classes or institutional settings. 
See i bid.; § 1413(a)(4). 
. . . 
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ously emotionally disturbed, orthopedically impaired, [and] 
other health impaired children, [and] children with specific 
learning disabilities." § 1401(1). 5 
The "free appropriate public education" required by the 
Act is tailored to the unique needs of the handicapped child 
by means of an "individualized educational rogram" (IEP). 
§ 1401(18). The P, which 1s prepare a a mee ing be-
tween a qualified representative of the local educational 
agency, the child's teacher, the child's parents or guardian, 
and, where appropriate, the child, consists of a written docu-
ment containing 
"(A) a statement of the present levels of educational 
performance of the child, (B) a statement of annual 
goals, including short-term instructional objectives, (C) 
a statement of the specific educational services to be pro-
vided to such child, and the extent to which such child 
will be able to participate in regular educational pro-
grams, (D) the projected date for initiation and antici-
pated duration of such service, and (E) ~ ob-
jective criteria and evaluation procedures arurSchedules 
for determining, on at least an annual basis, whether in-
structional objectives are being achieved." § 1401(19). 
Local or regional educational agencies must review, and 
where appropriate revise, each child's IEP at least annually. 
§ 1404(a)(5). See also §§ 1413(a)(ll), 1414(a)(5). 
In addition to the state plan and the IEP already de-
scribed, the Act im oses exten ·v ocedural re uirements 
upon States receiving fede al funds under 1ts prov1s1ons. 
Paren s or guardians of an icapped children must be noti-
fied of any proposed change in "the identification, evaluation, 
& In addition to covering a wide variety of handicapping conditions, the 
Act requires special educational services for children "regardless of the se-
verity of their handicap. " §§ 1412(2)(C), 1414(a)(l)(A). 
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or educational placement of the child or the provision of a free 
appropriate public education to the child," and must be per- . 
mitted to bring a complaint about "any matter relating to" 
such evaluation and education. § 1415(b)(l)(D) and (E). 6 
Complaints brought by parents or guardians must be re-
solved at "an impartial due process hearing," and appeal to 
the State educational agency must be provided if the initial 
hearing is held at the local or regional level. § 1415(b)(2) and 
(c). 7 Thereafter, "[a]ny party aggrieved by the findings and 







• The requirements that parents be permitted to file complaints regard-
ing their child's education, and be present when the child's IEP is formu-
lated, represent only two examples of Congress' effort to maximize paren-
tal involvement in the education of each handicapped child. In addition, 
the Act requires that parents be permitted "to examine all relevant records 
with respect to the identification, evaluation, and educational placement of 
the child, and .. . to obtain an independent educational evaluation of the 
child." § 1415(b)(1)(A). See also §§ 1412(4), 1414(a)(4). State educa-
tional policies and the state plan submitted to the Commissioner of Educa-
tion must be formulated in "consultation with individuals involved in or 
concerned with the education of handicapped children, including handi-
capped individuals and parents or guardians of handicapped children." 
~~ § 1412(7). See also § 1412(2)(E). Local agencies, which receive funds under the Act by applying to the state agency, must submit applications 
which assure that they have developed pro~ures for "the participation 
and consultation of the parents or guardian [s] f [handicapped] children"1 
in local educational programs, § 1414(a)(1)(C) m), and the application itself, 
along with "all pertinent documents related to such application," must be 
made "available to parents, guardians, and other members of the general 
public." § 1414(a)(4). 
7 "Any party" to a state or local administrative hearing must 
"be accorded (1) the right to be accompanied and advised by counsel and by 
individuals with special knowledge or training with respect to the problems 
of handicapped children, (2) the right to present evidence and confront, 
cross examine, and compel the attendance of witnesses, (3) the right to a 
written or electronic verbatim record of such hearing, and (4) the right to 
written findings of fact and decisions." § 1415(d). 
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to bring a civil action with respect to the complaint . . . in any 
State court of competent jurisdiction or in a district court of 
the United States without regard to the amount in contro-
versy." § 1415(e)(2). 
Thus, although the Act leaves to the States the primary 
responsibility for developing and executing educational pro-
grams for handicapped children, it imposes significant re-
quirements to be followed in the discharge of that respon-
sibility. Compliance is assured by provisions permitting the 
withholding of federal funds upon determination that a par-
ticipating state or local agency has failed to satisfy the re-
quirements of the Act, §§ 1414(b)(2)(A), 1416, and by the pro-
vision for judicial review. At pres·ent, all States except New 
Mexico receive federal funds under the portions of the AcCat 
issu; today. -Bri~(f~ thelJnited States as Amicus Curiae 
2, n. 2. 
II 
This case arose in connection with the education of Amy 
Rowley, a deaf student at the Furnace Woods School in the 
Hendrick Hudson Central School District, Peekskill, New 
York. Amy has minimal residual hearing and is an excellent 
lipreader. During the year before she began attending Fur-
nace Woods, a meeting between her parents and school ad-
ministrators resulted in a decision to place her in a regular 
kindergarten class in order to determine what supplemental 
services would be necessary to her education. Several mem-
bers of the school administration prepared for Amy's arrival 
by attending a course in sign-language interpretation, and a 
teletype machine was installed in the principal's office to fa-
cilitate communication with her parents who are also deaf. 
At the end of the trial period it was determined that Amy 
should remain in the kindergarten class, but that she should 
be provided with an FM hearing aid which would amplify 
words spoken into a wireless receiver by the teacher or fel-
low students during certain classroom activities. Amy suc-
cessfully completed her kindergarten year. 
80-1002-0PINION 
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As required by the Act, an IEP was prepared for Amy dur-
ing the fall of her first-grade year. The IEP provided that 
Amy should be educated in a regular classroom at Furnace 
Woods, should continue to use the FM hearing aid, and 
should receive instruction from a tutor for the deaf for one 
hour each day and from a speech therapist for three hours 
each week. The Rowleys agreed with the IEP but insisted 
that Amy also be rovided a qualified sign-Ian a iiir -
pre~er m all of her aca em1c c asses. uc an interpreter 
had been placed in Amy's kindergarten class for a two-week 
experimental period, but the interpreter had reported that 
Amy did not need his services at that time. The school ad-
ministrators likewise concluded that Amy did not need such 
an interpreter in her first-grade classroom. They reached 
this conclusion after consulting the school district's Commit-
tee on the Handicapped, which had received expert evidence 
from Amy's parents on the importance of a sign-language in-
terpreter, received testimony from Amy's teacher and other 
persons familiar with her academic and social progress, and 
visited a class for the deaf. 
When their request for an interpreter was denied, the 
Rowleys demanded and received a hearing before an inde-
pendent examiner. After rece1vmg evidence from both 
sides, the examiner agreed with the administrators' deter-
mination that an interpreter was not necessary because 
"Amy was achieving educationally, academically, and so-
cially" without such assistance. App. to Pet. for Cert. F -22. 
The examiner's decision was affirmed on appeal by the New 
York Commissioner of Education on the basis of substantial 
evidence in the record. !d., at E-4. Pursuant to the Act's 
provision for judicial review, the Rowleys then brought an 
action in the United States District Court for the Southern 
District of New York, claiming that the administrators' de-
nial of the sign-language interpreter constituted a denial of 
the "free appropriate public education" guaranteed by the 
Act. 
The District Court found that Amy "is a remarkably well-
80-1002-0PINION 
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adjusted child" who interacts and communicates well with 
her classmates and has "developed an extraordinary rapport" 
with her teachers. 483 F. Supp. 528, 531. It also found 
that "she performs better than the average child in her class 
and is advancing easily from grade to grade," id., at 534, but 
"that she understands considerably less of what goes on in 
class than she would if she were not deaf" and thus "is not 
learning as much, or performing as well academically, as she 
would without her handicap," id., at 532. This disparity be-
tween Amy's achievement and her potential led the court to 
decide that she was not receiving a "free appropriate public 
education," which the court defined as "an opportunity to 
achieve [her] full potential commensurate with the opportu-
nity provided to other children." I d., at 534. According to • 
the District C.o.yrt, such a ~rd "requires that the poten- f) <( ...S 
tial oTthe handicapped child be measured and comg.a,red to ~ 
his or her performance, and that the remaining differential or 
'snortfalPl>e comRared to the shortfall experienced by non-
handicapped c ildren. ' bi . e 1stnct ourt's defini-
tion arose from its assumption that the responsibility for 
"giv[ing] content to the requirement of an 'appropriate educa-
tion' " had "been left entirely to the federal courts and the 
hearing officers." I d., at 533. 8 
A divided panel of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Second Circuit affirmed. The Court of Appeals 
"agree[d] with the [D]istrict [C]ourt's conclusions of law," 
and held that its "findings of fact [were] not clearly errone-
ous." 632 F. 2d 945, 94 7 (1980). 
8 For reasons that are not revealed in the record, the District Court con-
cluded that "[t]he Act itself does not define 'appropriate education.'" 483 
F. Supp., at 533. In fact, the Act expressly defines the phrase. See 
§ 1401(18). After overlooking the statutory definition, the District Court 
sought guidance not from regulations interpreting the Act, but from regu-
lations promulgated under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. See 483 
F. Supp., at 533, citing 45 CFR § 84.33(b). 
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We granted certiorari to review the lower courts' interpre-
tation of the Act. 454 U. S. -- (1981). Such review re-
quires us to consider two questions: What is meant by the 
Act's requirement of a "free appropriate public education"? 
And what is the role of state and federal courts in exercising 
the review granted by§ 1415 of the Act? We consider these 
questions separately. 9 
III 
A 
This is the first case in which this Court has been called 
upon to interpret any provision of the Act. As noted previ-
ously, the District Court and the Court of Appeals concluded ~ 
that "[t]he Act itself does not define 'appropriate education,'" 
483 F. Supp., at 533, but leaves "to the courts and the hear-
ing officers" the responsibility of "giv[ing] content to the re-
quirement of an appropriate education." Ibid. See also 632 
F. 2d, at 947. Petitioners contend that the definition of the 
phrase "free appropriate public education" used by the courts ~.f ~ 
below overlooks the definition of that phrase actually found in ~-
the Act. Re~on_£ents a~e that the Act defines "free..ap- ' 
proE_riate public ~d~ation,' but contend thatthe ;t"atutory 
defi~ional" and thus "offers judges no guid-
~ 
• The IEP which respondents challenged in the District Court was ere- _ ~ J • 
ated for the 1978-1979 school year. Petitioners contend that the District
Court erred in reviewing that IEP after the school year had ended and be-
fore the school administrators were able to develop another IEP for subse-
quent years. We disagree. Judicial review invariably takes more than 
nine months to complete, not to mention the time consumed during the pre-
ceding state administrative hearings. The District Court thus correctly 
ruled that it retained jurisdication to grant relief because the alleged defi-
ciencies in the IEP were capable of repetition as to the parties before it yet 
evading review. Rowley v. The Board of Education of the Hendrick Hud-
son Central School District, 483 F. Supp. 536, 538 (1980). See Murphy v. 
Hunt, 455 U.S.--,-- (1982); Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147, 
149 (1975). 
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ance in their consideration of controversies involving the 
'identification, evaluation, or educational placement of the 
child or the provision of a free appropriate public education.'" 
Brief for Respondents 28. The United States, appearing as 
amicus curiae on behalf of respondents, states that "[a]l-
though the Act includes definitions of 'free appropriate public 
education' and other related terms, the statutory definitions 
do not adequately explain what is meant by 'appropriate."' 
Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 13. 
We are loath to conclude that Congress failed to offer any 
assistance in defining the meaning of the principal substan-
tive phrase used in the Act. It is beyond dispute that, con-
trary to the conclusions of the courts below, the Act does ex-
pressly define "free appropriate public education": 
"The term 'free appropriate public education' means spe-
cial education and related services which (A) have been 
provided at public expense, under public supervision and 
direction, and without charge, (B) meet the standards of 
the State educational agency, (C) include an appropriate 
preschool, elementary, or secondary school education in 
the State involved, and (D) are provided in conformity 
with the individualized education program required 
under section 1414(a)(5) of this title." § 1401(18) (em-
phasis added). 
"Special education," as referred to in this definition, means 
"specially designed instruction, at no cost to parents or 
guardians, to meet the unique needs of a handicapped child, 
including classroom instruction, instruction in physical educa-
tion, home instruction, and instruction in hospitals and insti-
tutions." § 1401(16). "Related services" are defined as 
"transportation, and such developmental, corrective, and 
other supportive services ... as may be required to assist a 
handicapped child to benefit from special education." 
§ 1401(17). 10 
10 Examples of "related services" identified in the Act are "speech pathol-
80-1002-0PINION 
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Like many statutory definitions, this one tends toward the 
cryptic rather than the comprehensive, but that is scarcely a 
reason for abandoning the quest for legislative intent. 
Whether or not the definition is a "functional" one, as re-
spondents contend it is not, it is the principal tool which Con-
gress has given us for parsing the critical phrase of the Act. 
We think more must be made of it than either respondents or 
the United States seems willing to admit. 
According to the definitions contained in the Act, a "free 
appropriate public education" consists of educational instruc-
tion specially designed to meet the unique needs of the handi-
capped child, supported by such services as are necessary to 
permit the child "to benefit" from t~e instruction. Almost as 
a checklist for adequacy under the Act, the definition also re-
quires that such instruction and services be provided at pub-
lic expense and under public supervision, meet the State's 
educational standards, approximate the grade levels used in 
the State's regular education, and comport with the child's 
IEP. Thus, if personalized instruction is being provided 
with sufficient supportive services to permit the child to ben-
efit from the instruction, and the other items on the defini-
tional checklist are satisfied, the child is receiving a "free ap-
propriate public education" as defined by the Act. 
Other portions of the statute also shed light upon con es-
siona m en . Congress e roug y e1g t mil-
lion hanaiCapped children in the United States at the time of 
enactment, one million were "excluded entirely from the pub-
lic school system" and more than half were receiving an 
inappropriate education. Note to § 1401. In addition, as 
mentioned in Part I, the Act requires States to extend educa-
tional services first to those children who are receiving no 
ogy and audiology, psychological services, physical and occupational ther-
apy, recreation, and medical and counseling services, except that such 
medical services shall be for diagnostic and evaluation purposes only." 
§ 1401(17). 
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education and second to those children who are receiving an 
"inadequate education." § 1412(3). When these express 
statutory findings and priorities are read together with the 
Act's extensive procedural requirements and its definition of 
"free appropriate public education," the face of the statute 
evinces a congressional intent to bring previously excluded 
handicapped children into the public education systems of the 
States and to require the States to adopt procedures which 
would result in individualized consideration of and instruction 
for each child. ~ 
~r Noticeably absent1 from the language of the statute is any . -~ ~v !ubstantive standard prescribing the level of education to be 
d .• ef)JJ""·. I' accorded handicapped children. Certainly the language of 
1~ ~ { the statute contains no requirement like the one imposed by 
heP- ( the lower courts-that States maximize the potential of 
bt. ~ f'\' handicapped children "commensurate with the opportunity 
· j provided to other children." 483 F. Supp., at 534. That 
standard was expounded by the District Court without refer-
ence to the statutory definitions or even to the legislative his-
.{:, tory of the Act. Although we find the statutory definition of 
( 
"free appropriate public education" to be helpful in our inter-
pretation of the Act, there remains the question of whether 
the legislative history indicates a congressional intent that 
such education meet some additional substantive standard. 
For an answer, we turn to t~. 
B 
(i) 
As suggested in Part I, federal support for education of the 
handicapped is a fairly recent development. Before passage 
of the Act some States had passed laws to improve the educa-
tional services afforded handicapped children, 11 but many of 
these children were excluded completely from any form of 
11 See H.R. Rep. No. 94-332, supra, at 10; Note, The Education of All 
Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Mich. J. L. Ref. 110, 119 (1976). 
... 
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public education or were left to fend for themselves in class-
rooms designed for education of their nonhandicapped peers. 
The House Report begins by emphasizing this exclusion and 
misplacement, noting that millions of handicapped children 
"were either totally excluded from schools or [were] sitting 
idly in regular classrooms awaiting the time when they were 
old enough to 'drop out."' H.R. Rep. No. 94-332, supra, at 
2. See also S. Rep. No. 94-168, p. 8 (1975). One of the 
Act's two princi al sponsors in the Senate urged its passage 
in similar erms: 
"While much progress has been made in the last few 
years, we can take no solace in that progress until all 
handicapped children are, in fact, receiving an education. 
The most recent statistics provided by the Bureau of 
Education for the Handicapped estimate that . . . 1. 75 
million handicapped children do not receive any educa-
tional services, and 2.5 million handicapped children are 
not receiving an appropriate education." 121 Cong. 
Rec. 19486 (1975) (remarks of Sen. Williams). 
This concern, stressed repeatedly throughout the legisla-
tive history, 12 confirms the impression conveyed by the lan-
guage of the statute: By passing the Act, Congress sought 
primarily to make public education available to handicapped 
children. But in seeking to provide such access to public 
education, Congress did not impose upon the States any 
greater substantive educational standard than would be nec-
essary to make such access meaningful. Indeed, Congress 
'
2 See, e. g., 121 Cong. Rec. 19494 (1975) (remarks of Sen. Javits) ("all too 
often, our handicapped citizens have been denied the opportunity to re-
ceive an adequate education"); 121 Cong. Rec. 19502 (1975) (remarks of 
Sen. Cranston) (millions of handicapped "children are largely excluded 
from educational opportunities that we give to our other children"); 121 
Cong. Rec. 23708 (1975) (remarks of Rep. Mink) ("handicapped children 
. . . are denied access to public schools because of a lack of trained 
personnel"). 
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expressly "recognize[d] that in many instances the process of 
providing special education and related services to handi-
capped children is not guaranteed to produce any particular 
outcome." S. Rep. No. 94-168, supra, at 11. Thus, the in-
tent of the Act was more to open the door of public education 
to handicapped children on awropria!& terms than to guaran-
tee any particular level of education once ms1oe. 
Both the House and the Senate reports attribute the impe-
tus for the Act and its predecessors to two federal court judg-
ments rendered in 1971 and 1972. As the Senate Report 
states, passage of the Act "followed a series of landmark 
court cases establishing in law the right to education for all 
handicapped children." S. Rep. · No. 94-168, supra, at 6. 13 
The first case, Pennsylvania Association for Retarded Chil-
dren v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania (PARC), 334 F. 
Supp. 1257 (1971), 343 F. Supp. 279 (ED Pa 1972), was a suit 
on behalf of retarded children challenging the constitutional-
ity of a Pennsylvania statute which acted to exclude them 
from public education and training. The case ended in a con-
sent decree which enjoined the State from "deny[ing] to any 
mentally retarded child access to a free public program of 
education and training." 334 F. Supp., at 1258 (emphasis 
added). 
PARC was followed by Mills v. Board of Education of the 
District of Columbia, 348 F. Supp. 866 (DC 1972), a case in 
which the plaintiff handicapped children had been excluded 
from the District of Columbia public schools. The court's 
judgment, quoted at page 6 of the Senate Report on the Act, 
provided 
"[t]hat no [handicapped] child eligible for a publicly 
supported education in the District of Columbia public 
13 Similarly, the Senate Report states that it was an "[i]ncreased aware-
ness of the educational needs of handicapped children and landmark court 
decisions establishing the right to education for handicapped children [that] 
pointed to the necessity of an expanded federal role." S. Rep. No. 94-168, 
supra, at 5. See also H.R. Rep. No. 94-332, supra, at 2-3. 
80-1002-0PINION 
HENDRICK HUDSON DIST. BD. OF ED. v. ROWLEY 15 
schools shall be excluded from a regular school assign-
ment by a Rule, policy, or practice of the Board of Edu-
cation of the District of Columbia or its agents unless 
such child is provided (a) adequate alternative educa-
tional services suited to the child's needs, which may in-
clude special education or tuition grants, and (b) a con-
stitutionally adequate prior hearing and periodic review 
of the child's status, progress, and the adequacy of any 
educational alternative." 348 F. Supp., at 878 (empha-
sis added). 
Mills and Pl!fiC both held that handicapped children must J2..-t!-~ 
be giVen access to an aaequate, publicly supported education. ~
Neither case purports to require ·any particular substantive  
level of education. 14 Rather, like the language of the Act, ~ . ~ ~. ~~ .7:, n 
the cases set fqr_th ext~nsive procedu~s to be followed in for- ____. 
mlllating personalizedeaUcational programs for handicapped -; - ' · ~ · -
children. See 348 F. Supp., at 878-883; 334 F. Supp., at ~ 
1258-1267. 15 The fact that both PARC and Mills are dis- ~ 
"If sufficient funds are not available to finance all of the services and pro-
grams that are needed and desirable in the system then the available funds 
must be expended equitably in such a manner that no child is entirely ex-
cluded from a publicly supported education consistent with his needs and 
ability to benefit therefrom. The inadequacies of the District of Columbia 
Public School System whether occasioned by insufficient funding or admin-
istrative inefficiency, certainly cannot be pennitted to bear more heavily 
on the 'exceptional' or handicapped child than on the nonnal child." !d., at 
876. 
15 Like the Act, P ARC required the State to "identify, locate, [and] eval-
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cussed at length in the legislative reports 16 suggests that the 
principles which they established are the principles which, to 
a significant extent, guided the drafters of the Act. Indeed, 
immediately after discussing these cases the Senate R~rt t 
describes the 1974 statute as having "incorporated themajor 
principles of the right to education cases." S. Rep. No 
94-168, supra, at 8. Those principles in turn became the 
basis of the Act, which itself was designed to effectuate the 
purposes of the 1974 statute. H.R. Rep. No. 94-332, supra, 
at 5. 17 
an individual educational program, id., at 1265, and to hold a hearing "on 
any change in educational assignment," iff., at 1266. Mills also required 
the preparation of an individual educational program for each child. In ad-
dition, Mills permitted the child's parents to inspect records relevant to 
the child's education, to obtain an independent educational evaluation of 
the child, to object to the IEP and receive a hearing before an independent 
hearing officer, to be represented by counsel at the hearing, and to have 
the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses, all of which are 
also permitted by the Act. 348 F. Supp., at 879-881. Like the Act, Mills 
also required that the education of handicapped children be conducted pur-
suant to an overall plan prepared by the District of Columbia, and estab-
lished a policy of educating handicapped children with nonhandicapped chil-
dren whenever possible. Ibid. 
16 See S. Rep. No. 94-168, supra, at 6-7; H.R. Rep. No. 94-332, supra, 
at 3-4. 
n The 1974 statute "incorporated the major principles of the right to edu-
cation cases," by "add[ing] important new provisions to the Education of 
the Handicapped Act which require the States to: establish a goal of pro-
viding full educational opportunities to all handicapped children; provide 
procedures for insuring that handicapped children and their parents or 
guardians are guaranteed procedural safeguards in decisions regarding 
identification, evaluation, and educational placement of handicapped chil-
dren; establish procedures to insure that, to the maximum extent appropri-
ate, handicapped children ... are educated with children who are not 
handicapped; ... and establish procedures to insure that testing and eval-
uation materials and procedures utilized for the purposes of classification 
and placement of handicapped children will be selected and administered so 
as not to be racially or culturally discriminatory." S. Rep. No. 94-168, 
80-1002-0PINION 
HENDRICK HUDSON DIST. BD. OF ED. v. ROWLEY 17 
That the Act imposes no clear obligation upon recipient 
States beyond the requirement that handicapped children re-
ceive some form of specialized education is perhaps best dem-
onstrated by the fact that Congress, in explaining the need 
for the Act, equated an "appropriate education" to the re-
ceipt of some specialized educational services. The Senate 
Report states: "[T]he most recent statistics provided by the 
Bureau of Education for the Handicapped estimate that of 
the more than 8 million children . . . with handicapping condi-
tions requiring special education and related services, only 
3. 9 million such children are receiving an appropriate educa-
tion." S. Rep. No. 94-168, supra, at 8. 18 This statement, 
which reveals Congress' view that 3. 9 million handicapped 
children were "receiving an appropriate education" in 1975, is 
followed immediately in the Senate Report by a table show-
ing that 3. 9 million handicapped children were "served" in 
supra, at 8. 
The House Report explains that the Act simply incorporated these pur-
poses of the 1974 statute: the Act was intended "primarily to amend ... 
the Education of the Handicapped Act in order to provide permanent au-
thorization and a comprehensive mechanism which will insure that those 
provisions enacted during the 93rd Congress [the 1974 statute] will result 
in maximum benefits for handicapped children and their families." H.R. 
Rep. No. 94-332, supra, at 5. Thus, the 1974 statute's purpose of provid-
ing handicapped children access to a public education became the purpose 
of the Act. 
18 These statistics appear repeatedly throughout the legislative history of 
the Act, demonstrating a virtual consensus among legislators that 3.9 mil-
lion handicapped children were receiving an appropriate education in 1975. 
See, e. g., 121 Cong. Rec. 19486 (1975) (remarks of Sen. Williams); 121 
Cong. Rec. 19504 (1975) (remarks of Sen. Schweicker); 121 Cong. Rec. 
23702 (1975) (remarks of Rep. Madden); 121 Cong. Rec. 23702 (1975) (re-
marks of Rep. Brademas); 121 Cong. Rec. 23709 (1975) (remarks of Rep. 
Minish); 121 Cong. Rec. 37024 (1975) (remarks of Rep. Brademas); 121 
Cong. Rec. 37027 (1975) (remarks of Rep. Gude); 121 Cong. Rec. 37417 
(1975) (remarks of Sen Javits); 121 Cong. Rec. 37420 (1975) (remarks of 
Sen. Hathaway). 
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1975 and a slightly larger number were "unserved." A simi-
lar statement and table appear in the House Report. H.R. 
Rep. No. 94-332, supra, at 11-12. 
It is evident from the legislative history that the charac-
terization of handicapped children as "served" referred to 
children who were receiving some form of specialized educa-
tional services from the States, and that the characterization 
of children as "unserved" referred to those who were receiv-
ing no specialized educational services. For example, a let-
ter sent to the United States Commissioner of Education by 
the House Committee on Education and Labor, signed by 
two key sponsors of the Act in the House, asked the Commis-
sioner to identify the number ·of handicapped "children 
served" in each State. The letter asked for statistics on the 
number of children "being served" in various types of "special 
education program[s]" and the number of children who were 
not "receiving educational services." Hearings on S. 6 be-
fore the Subcommittee on the Handicapped of the Senate 
Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, 94th Cong., 1st 
Sess., 205-207 (1975). Similarly, Senator Randolph, one of 
the Act's principal sponsors in the Senate, noted that roughly 
one-half of the handicapped children in the United States 
"are receiving special educational services." I d., at 1. 19 By 
'
9 Senator Randolph stated: "only 55 percent of the school-aged handi-
capped children and 22 percent of the pre-school-aged handicapped children 
are receiving special educational services." Hearings on S. 6 before the 
Subcommittee on the Handicapped of the Senate Committee on Labor and 
Public Welfare, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 1 (1975). Although the figures dif-
fer slightly in various parts of the legislative history, the general thrust of 
congressional calculations was that roughly one-half of the handicapped 
children in the United States were not receiving specialized educational 
services, and thus were not "served." See, e. g., 121 Cong. Rec. 19494 
(1975) (remarks of Sen Javits) ("only 50 percent of the Nation's handi-
capped children received proper education services"); 121 Cong. Rec. 19504 
(1975) (remarks of Sen. Humphrey) ("[a]lmost 3 million handicapped chil-
dren, while in school, receive none of the special services that they require 
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characterizing the 3.9 million handicapped children who were 
"served" as children who were "receiving an appropriate edu-
cation," the Senate and House reports unmistakably disclose 
Congress' perception of the type of education required by the 
Act: an "appropriate education" is provided when personal-
ized educational ii~ruiQ8S. are provided. w 
23706 (1975) (remarks of Rep. Quie) ("only 55 percent [of handicapped chil-
dren] were receiving a public education"); 121 Cong. Rec. 233709 (1975) 
(remarks of Rep. Biaggi) ("[o]ver 3 million [handicapped] children in this 
country are receiving either below par education or none at all"). 
Statements similar to those appearing in the text, which equate "served" 
as it appears in the Senate Report to "receiving special educational serv-
ices," appear throughout the legislative .history. See, e. g., 121 Cong. 
Rec. 19492 (1975) (remarks of Sen Williams); 121 Cong. Rec. 19494 (1975) 
(remarks of Sen. Javits); 121 Cong. Rec. 19496 (1975) (remarks of Sen. 
Stone); 121 Cong. Rec. 19504-19505 (1975) (remarks of Sen. Humphrey); 
121 Cong. Rec. 23703 (1975) (remarks of Rep. Brademas); Hearings on 
H.R. 7217 before the Subcommittee on Select Education of the Committee 
on Education and Labor of the House of Representatives, 94th Cong. , 1st 
Sess., 91 , 150, 153 (1975); Hearings on H.R. 4199 before the Select Sub-
committee on Education of the Committee on Education and Labor of the 
House of Representatives, 93rd Con g., 1st Sess., 130, 139 (1973). See also 
45 CFR § 121a.343(b) (1980). 
20 In seeking to read more into the Act than its language or legislative 
history will permit, the United States focuses upon the word "appropri-
ate," arguing that "the statutory definitions do not adequately explain 
what [it means]." Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae 13. 
Whatever Congress meant by an "appropriate" education, it is clear that it 
did not mean a potential-maximizing education. 
The term as used in reference to educating the handicapped appears to 
have originated in the P ARC decision, where the District Court required 
that handicapped children be provided with "education and training appro-
priate to [their] learning capacities." 334 F . Supp., at 1258. The word 
appears again in the Mills decision, the District Court at one point refer-
ring to the need for "an appropriate educational program," 348 F. Supp., 
at 879, and at another point speaking of a "suitable publicly-supported edu-
cation," id., at 878. Both cases also refer to the need for an "adequate" 
education. See 334 F. Supp., at 1266; 348 F. Supp., at 878. 
The use of "appropriate" in the language of the Act, although by no 
means definitive, suggests that Congress used the word as much to de-
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(ii) 
Respondents contend that "the goal of the Act is to provide 
each handicapped child with an equal educational opportu-
nity." Brief for Respondents 35. We think, however, that 
the requirement that a State provide specialized educational 
services to handicapped children generates no additional re-
qUirement that the services so provided be sufficient to maxi-
{ 
mize each child's potential "commensurate with the opportu-
~ nity provided other children . ..,.,. Responaents and1he United 
/ States correctly notethal Congress sought "to provide assis-
tance to the States in carrying out their responsibilties under 
... the Constitution of the United States to provide equal 
protection of the laws." S. Rep. ·No. 94-168, supra, at 13. 21 
But we do not think that such statements imply a congres-
sional intent to achieve strict equality of opportunity or 
services. 
The educational opportunities provided by our public 
school systems undoubtedly differ from student to student, 
depending upon a myriad of factors that might affect a par-
ticular student's ability to assimilate information presented in 
scribe the settings in which handicapped children should be educated as to 
prescribe the substantive content or supportive services of their education. 
For example, § 1412(5) requires that handicapped children be educated in 
classrooms with nonhandicapped children "to the maximum extent appro-
priate." Similarly, § 1401(19) provides that, "whenever appropriate," 
handicapped children should attend and participate in the meeting at which 
their IEP is drafted. In addition, the definition of "free appropriate public 
education" itself states that instruction given handicapped children should 
be at an "appropriate preschool, elementary, or secondary school" level. 
§ 1401(18)(C). Thus, use of the word "appropriate" seems to reflect Con-
gress' recognition that some settings are simply not suitable environments 
for the participation of some handicapped children. At the very least, 
these statutory uses of the word refute the contention that Congress used 
"appropriate" as a term of art which concisely expresses the standard 
found by the lower courts. 
"See also 121 Cong. Rec. 19492 (1975) (remarks of Sen. Williams); 121 
Cong. Rec. 19504 (1975) (remarks of Sen. Humphrey). 
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the classroom. The requirement that States provide "eql_!al" 
educational opportunities would thus seem to present an en-
tirely unworkable stan r e umn · ossible measure-
ments an comparisons. Similarly, furnishing han I capped 
ch~such services as are available to nonhandi-
capped children would in all probability fall short of the statu-
tory requirement of "free appropriate public education"; to 
require, on the other hand, the furnishing of every special 
service necessary to maximize each handicapped child's po-
tential is, we think, further than Congress intended to go. 
Thus to speak in terms of "equal" services in one instance 
gives less than what is required by the Act and in another 
instance more. The theme of the Act is "free appropriate 
public education," a phrase which is too complex to be cap-
tured by the word "equal" whether one is speaking of oppor-
tunities or services. 
The legislative conception of the requirements of equal pro-
tection was undoubtedly informed by the two district court 
decisions referred to above. But cases such as Mills and 
P ARC held simply that handicapped children may not be ex-
cluded entirely from public education. In Mills, the District 
Court said: 
"If sufficient funds are not available to finance all of the 
services and programs that are needed and desirable in 
the system then the available funds must be expended 
equitably in such a manner that no child is entirely ex-
cluded from a publicly supported education consistent 
with his needs and ability to benefit therefrom." 348 F. 
Supp., at 876. 
The P ARC Court used similar language, saying "[i]t is the 
commonwealth's obligation to place each mentally retarded 
child in a free, public program of education and training ap-
propriate to the child's capacity .... " 334 F. Supp., at 1260. 
The right of access to free public education enunciated by 
these cases is significantly different from any notion of abso-
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lute equality of opportunity regardless of capacity. To the 
extent that Congress might have looked further than these 
cases which are mentioned in the legislative history, at the 
time of enactment of the Act this Court had held at least 
twice that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment does not require States to expend equal financial 
resources on the education of each child. San Antonio 
School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 1 (1975); Mcinnis v. 
Shapiro, 293 F. Supp. 327 (ND Ill. 1968), affd sub nom, 
Mcinnis v. Ogilvie, 394 U. S. 322 (1969). 
In explaining the need for federal legislation, the House 
Report noted that "no congressional legislation has required 
a precise guarantee for handicapped children, i. e. a basic 
floor of opportunity that would bring into compliance all 
school districts with the constitutional right of equal protec-
tion with respect to handicapped children." H.R. Rep. No. 
94-332, supra, at 14. Assuming that the Act was designed 
to fill the need identified in the House Report-that is, to 
provide a "basic floor of opportunity" consistent with equal 
protection-neither the Act nor its history persuasively dem-
onstrate that Congress thought that equal protection re-
quired anything more than e ual access. Therefore, Con-
gress' desire to provide s ecialize e uca 10nal serv1 s even 
m u erance o equality,' cannot be read as im osin an 
pa 1cu ar su s an 1ve e uca 10na standard upon the States. 
'rhus, the D1stnct Court and the Court of Appeals erred 
when they held that the Act requires New York to maximize 
the potential of each handicapped child commensurate with 
the opportunity provided nonhandicapped children. Desir-
able though that goal might be, it is not the standard that 
Congress imposed upon States which receive funding under 
the Act. Rather, Congress sought primarily to identify and 
evaluate handicapped children, and to provide them with ac-
cess to a free public education. 
(iii) 
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a "free appropriate public education" is the requirement that 
th,e education to which access is provided be sufficient to con-
fer some educational benefit u on the handica ed child. It 
woul o Itt e goo or ongress to spend millions of dollars 
in providing access to a public education only to have the 
handicapped child receive no benefit from that education. 
The statutory definition of "free appropriate public educa-
tiQn, "in adaition to requiring that StaTes pro viae eaCh child 
with "specially designed instruction," expressly requires the 
provision of "such ... supportive services ... as rna 1e re-
quired to assist a handicapped child o ene t from s_necial 
education." § 1401(17). We therefore conclude thatthe I 
"basic floor of opportumty" provided by the Act consists of 
access to specialized instruction and services from which a 
handicapped child can obtain"some educational benefit'~22 
22 This view is supported by the congressional intention, frequently ex-
pressed in the legislative history, that handicapped children be enabled to 
achieve a reasonable degree of self sufficiency. After referring to statis-
tics showiilg that many handicapped children were excluded from public 
education, the Senate Report states: 
"The long range implications of these statistics are that public agencies and 
taxpayers will spend billions of dollars over the lifetimes of these individ-
uals to maintain such persons as dependents and in a minimally acceptable 
lifestyle. With proper education services, many would be able to become 
productive citizens, contributing to society instead of being forced to re-
main burdens. Others, through such services, would increase their inde-
pendence, thus reducing their dependence on society." S. Rep. No. 
94-168, supra, at 9. See also H.R. Rep. No. 9W32, supra, at 11. 
Similarly, one of the principal Senate sponsors of the Act stated that "pro-
viding appropriate educational services now means that many of these indi-
viduals will be able to become a contributing part of our society, and they 
will not have to depend on subsistance payments from public funds." 121 
Cong. Rec. 19492 (1975) (remarks of Sen. Williams). See also 121 Cong. 
Rec. 25541 (1975) (remarks of Rep. Harkin); 121 Cong. Rec. 3702W7025 
(1975) (remarks of Rep. Brademas); 121 Cong. Rec. 37027 (1975) (remarks 
of Rep. Gude); 121 Cong. Rec. 37410 (1975) (remarks of Sen. Randolph); 
121 Cong. Rec. 37416 (1975) (remarks of Sen Williams). 
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The 9/termination of ~handi<mpped children are re- 1 1 W If. 
ceiving 'sufficient educational benefit§ to satisfy the require-.. ~ 
ments of the Act presents a more difficult problem. The Act ~· 
f
requires participating States to educate a wide spectrum of 
handicapped children, from the marginally hearing-impaired 
to the profoundly retarded and palsied. It is clear tha~ the _ ,~ 1 . _ o 
benefits obtainable b children at one end of the spectrum 
[
will differ dramatically om those obtainable y c 1 r n at ~J _ •• 1_ J.- \ 
th~ other en , With m mte vanations in oetween. One child ~_, 
may have little difficulty competing successfully in an aca-
demic setting with nonhandicapped children while another 
child may encounter great difficulty in acquiring even the 
most basic of self-maintenance skills. We do not attempt to-
day to establish any one test for determining the adequacy of 
educational benefits conferred upon all children covered by ~ _ _ 
the Act. Rather, because in this case we are presented wit.hu 
~ child capable of bei"Rg e<Jy~ated i'R the regYlar classrooms of ~.fe..tj( 
_a public school system, we confine our analysis to th~t . 1 _ /? ~~ __ . 
situation. l"""'bl ~"--"7 I" 
- The Act requires participating States to educate handi- A .J~- _ _J _ 
capped children with nonhandicapped children whenever pos- ,__..~ 
The desire to provide handicapped children with an attainable degree of 
personal independence obviously anticipated that state educational pro-
grams would confer educational benefits upon such children. Bll~ at the / ----
same time, the goal of achieving/ (ome degree of self sufficienc r ' n most ~ 
cases is a good deal more modest t an e po en 1a -maximizi g goal 
adopted by the lo~er courts. 
Despite its frequent mention, we can id the dissent in 
the Court of Appeals that self sufficienc was itself the substantive stan -
!!rd which Congress imposed upon the States. Because many m1 y 
handicapped children will achieve self sufficiency without state assistance 
while personal independence for the severely handicapped may be an un-
reachable goal, "self sufficiency" as a substantive standard is at once an in-
adequate protection and an overly demanding requirement. We thus view 
these references in the legislative history as evidence of Congress' inten-
tion ~at the services provided handicapped children bl~ducationally bene; 
ficial, whatever the nature or severity of their handicap. - .. 
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sible. 23 When that "mainstreaming" preference of the Act 
has been met and a child is being educated in the regular 
classrooms of a public school system, the system itself moni-
tors the educational progress of the child. Regular examina-
tions are administered, grades are awardedl and yearly ad-
vancement to higher grade levels is permitted for those 
children who attain an adequate knowledge of the course ma-
terial. The grading and advancement system thus serves as 
a determinant of educational benefit. Children who gradu-
ate from our public school systems are considered by our soci-
ety to have been "educated" at least to the grade level they 
have completed, and access to an "education" for handicapped 
children is precisely what Congress sought to provide in the 
Act. Thus, handicapped children who have been placed by1 
the State in regular classrooms of the public education sys-
tem, and who are achieving passing marks and advancing 
from grade to grade, are rece1vmg the substantive educa-
tional benefits anticipated by the Act. 
c 
When the language of the Act and its legislative history are 
considered together, the requirements imposed by Congress 
become tolerably clear. Insofar as a State is required to pro-
vide a handicapped child with a "free appropriate public edu-
cation," we hold that it satisfies this regui!:_ement b~QYid­
ing perso8ahzed instructwp With sufficient support sgrvices 
to permit the child to benefit educationatry from that inst 
2:1 Section 1412(5) of the Act requires that participating States establish 
"procedures to assure that, to the maximum extent appropriate, handi-
capped children, including children in public or private institutions or other 
care facilities, are educated with children who are not handicapped, and 
that special classes, separate schooling, or other removal of handicapped 
children from the regular educational environment occurs only when the 
nature or severity of the handicap is such that education in regular classes 
with the use of supplementary aids and services cannot be achieved 
satisfactorily." 
' ' 
~QA/.f{) . H~ 
~~--
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tion. Such instruction and services must be provided at pub-
lic expense, must meet the State's educational standards, 
must approximate the grade levels used in the State's regular 
education, and must comport with the child's IEP. In addi-
tion, the IEP, and therefore the personalized instruction, 
should be formulated in accordance with the requirements of 
the Act and, if the child is being educated in the regular class-
rooms of the public education system, should be reasonablJ_T ) 
calculated t the child to achieve assin marks anq 
a ce om grade to grade. 24 
IV 
A 
As mentioned in Part I, the Act permits "[a]ny party ag-
24 In defending the decisions of the District Court and the Court of Ap- ' 
peals, respondents and the United States rely upon isolated statements in 
the legislative history concerning the achievement of maximum potential, 
see H.R. Rep. No. 94-332, supra, at 13, as support for their contention 
that Congress intended to impose greater substantive requirements than 
we have found. These statements, however, are too thin a reed on which 
to base an interpretation of the Act which disregards both its language and 
the balance of its legislative history. "Passing references and isolated 
phrases are not controlling when analyzing a legislative history." Depart-
ment of State v. The Wash ington Post Co.,-- U. S. -- (1982). 
Moreover, even were we to agree that these statements evince a con-
gressional intent to maximize each child's potential, we could not hold that 
Congress had successfully imposed that burden upon the States. 
"[L]egislation enacted pursuant to the spending power is much in the na-
ture of a contract: in return for federal funds, the States agree to comply 
with federally imposed conditions. The legitimacy of Congress' power to 
legislate under the spending power thus rests on whether the State volun-
tarily and knowingly accepts the terms of the 'contract.' . . . Accordingly, 
if Congress intends to impose a condition on the grant of federal moneys, it 
must do so unambiguously." Pennhurst State School v. Halderman, 451 
u. s. 1, 17 (1981). 
As already demonstrated, the Act and its history impose no requirements 
on the States like those imposed by the District Court and the Court of 
Appeals. A fortiori Congress has not done so unambiguously, as required 
in the valid exercise of its spending power. 
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grieved by the findings and decision" of the state adminis-
trative hearings "to bring a civil action" in "any State court of 
competent jurisdiction or in a district court of the United 
States without regard to the amount in controversy." 
§ 1415(e)(2). The complaint, and therefore the civil action, 
may concern "any matter relating to the identification, eval-
uation, or educational placement of the child, or the provision 
of a free appropriate public education to such child." 
§ 1415(b)(l)(E). In reviewing the complaint, the Act pro-
vides that a court "shall receive the record of the [state] ad-
ministrative proceeding, shall hear additional evidence at the 
request of a party, and, basing its decision on the preponder-
ance of the evidence, shall. grant such relief as the court de-
termines is appropriate. '~ § 1415(e)(2). 
The parties disagree sharply over the meaning of these 
provisions, petitioners contending that courts are given only 
limited authority to review for state compliance with the 
Act's procedural requirements and no power to review the 
substance of the state program, and respondents contending 
that the Act requires courts to exercise de novo review over 
state educational decisions and policies. We find petitioners' 
contention unpersuasive, for Congress expressly rejected 
provisions tliat woiii<fhave so severely restricted the role of 
reviewing courts. In substituting the current language of 
the statute for language that would have made state adminis-
trative findings conclusive if supported by substantial evi-
dence, the Conference Committee explained that courts were 
to make "independent decision[s] based on a preponderance 
of the evidence." S. Conf. Rep. No. 94-455, supra, at 50. 
See also 121 Cong. Rec. 37416 (1975) (remarks of Sen 
Williams). 
But although we find that this grant of authority is broader 
than claimed by petitioners, we think the fact that it is found 
in § 1415 of the Act, which is entitled "Procedural Safe-
guards," is not without significance. When the elaborate 
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and highly specific procedural safeguards embodied in § 1415 
are contrasted with the general and somewhat imprecise sub-
stantive admonitions contained in the Act, we think that the 
importance Congress attached to these procedural safe-
guards cannot be gainsaid. It seems to us no exaggeration 
to say that Congress placed every bit as much emphasis upon 
compliance with procedures giving parents and guardians a 
large measure of participation at every stage of the adminis-
trative process, see, e. g. § 1415(a}-(d), as it did upon the 
measurement of the resulting IEP against a substantive 
standard. We think that the Congressional emphasis upon 
full participation of concerned parties throughout the devel-
opment of the IEP, as well as the requirements that state 
and local plans be submitted to the Commissioner for ap-
proval, demonstrate the legislative conviction that adequate 
compliance with the procedures prescribed would in most 
cases assure much if not all of what Con ess wished in the 
way o su stantive content in an IEP. 
Thus the provision that a reviewing court base its decision 
on the "preponderance of the evidence" is ~y no means an in-
vitation to the courts to substitute their own nobo~s of souna 
educational olic for chool authorities which 
t ey reyjew, The very importance which Congress has at-
tached to compliance with certain procedures in the prepara-
tion of an IEP would be frustrated if a court were permitted 
simply to set state decisions at nought. The fact that 
§ 1415(e) requires that the reviewing court "receive the 
records of the [state] administrative proceedings" carries 
with it the implied requirement that due weight shall be 
given to these proceedings. And we find nothing in the Act 
to suggest that merely because Congress was rather sketchy 
in establishing substantive requirements, as opposed to pro-
cedural requirements for the preparation of an IEP, it in-
tended that reviewing courts should have a free hand to im-
pose substantive standards of review which cannot be 
derived from the Act itself. In short, the statutory authori-
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zation to grant "such relief as the court determines is appro-
priate" cannot be read without reference to the obligations, 
largely procedural in nature, which are imposed upon recipi-
ent States by Congress. 
Therefore, a court's ~iry in suits brought under 
§ 1415(e)(2) is twofold.~. has the State complied with 
the procedures set forth in the Act? 25 An~ is the in-
dividualized educational program developea-fh~ough the 
Act's procedures reasonably calculated to enable the child to 
receive educatiomif benefits? 26 If these requirements are 
met, the State has complied With the obligations imposed by 
Congress and the courts can require no more. 
B 
In assuring that the requirements of the Act have been 
met, courts must be careful to void im osing their view of 
prefera e e uc 10na methods upon the States. 27 Tne pri-
mary r~ty Tor formllratmg tneeducation to be ac-
corded a handicapped child, and for choosing the educational 
method most suitable to the child's needs, was left by the Act 
to state and local educational agencies in cooperation with the 
25 This inquiry will require a court not only to satisfy itself that the State 
has adopted the state plan, policies, and assurances required by the Act, 
but also to determine that the State has created an IEP for the child in 
question which conforms with the requirements of§ 1401(19). 
26 This second .I)W of the inquiry wjl! be satisfied in cases such as this one 
by a showin that · · assin marks and is advancing 
om grade to grade.. See Part III, supra. 
27 In this case, for example, both the state hearing officer and the District 
Court were presented with evidence as to the best method for educating 
the deaf, a question long debated among scholars. See Large, Special 
Problems of the Deaf Under the Education for All Handicapped Children 
Act of 1975, 58 Washington U. L. Q. 213, 229 (1980). The District Court 
accepted the testimony of respondents' experts that there was "a trend 
supported by studies showing the greater degree of success of students 
brought up in deaf households using [the method of communication used by 
the Rowleys]." 483 F. Supp., at 535. 
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parents or guardian of the child. The Act expressly charges 
States with the responsibility of "acquiring and disseminating 
to teachers and administrators of programs for handicapped 
children significant information derived from educational re-
search, demonstration, and similar projects, and [of] adopt-
ing, where appropriate, promising educational practices and 
materials." § 1413(a)(3). In the face of such a clear statu-
tory directive, it seems highly unlikely that Congress in-
tended courts to overturn a State's choice of appropriate edu-
cational theories in a proceeding conducted pursuant to 
§ 1415(e)(2).28 
We previously have cautioned that courts lack the "special-
ized knowledge and experience" n~cessary to resolve "persis-
tent and difficult questions of educational policy." San An-
tonio School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 1, 42 (1973). 
We think that Congress shared that view when it passed the 
Act. As already demonstrated, Congress' intention was not 
that the Act displace the primacy of States in the field of edu-
cation, but that States receive funds to assist them in extend-
ing their educational systems to the handicapped. There-
fore, once a court determines that the requirements of the 
Act have been met, questions of methodology are for resolu-
tion by the States. 
v 
Entrusting a child's education to state and local agencies 
does not leave the child without protection. Congress 
sought to protect individual children by providing for paren-
tal involvement in the development of State plans and poli-
2ll It is clear that Congress was aware of the States' traditional role in the 
formulation and execution of educational policy. "Historically, the States 
have had the primary responsibility for the education of children at the ele-
mentary and secondary level." 121 Cong. Rec. 19498 (1975) (remarks of 
Sen. Dole). See also Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U. S. 97, 104 (1968) 
("[b]y and large, public education in our Nation is committed to the control 
of state and local authorities"). 
'. 
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cies, supra, at -- and n. 6, and in the formulation of the 
child's individual educational program. As the Senate Re-
port states: 
"The Committee recognizes that in many instances the 
process of providing special education and related serv-
ices to handicapped children is not guaranteed to pro-
duce any particular outcome. By changing the language 
[of the provision relating to individualized educational 
programs] to emphasize the process of parent and child 
involvement and to provide a written record of reason-
able expectations, the Committee intends to clarify that 
such individualized planning conferences are a way to 
provide parent involvement · and protection to assure 
that appropriate services are provided to a handicapped 
child." S. Rep. No. 94-168, supra, at 11-12. See also 
S. Conf. Rep. No. 94-445, p. 30 (1975); 45 CFR 
§ 121a.345 (1980). 
As this very case demonstrates, parents and guardians will 
not lack ardor in seeking to ensure that handicapped children 
receive all of the benefits to which they are entitled by the 
Act. 29 
29 In addition to providing for extensive parental involvement in the for-
mulation of state and local policies, as well as the preparation of individual 
educational programs, the Act ensures that States will receive the advice 
of experts in the field of educating handicapped children. As a condition 
for receiving federal funds under the Act, States must create "an advisory 
panel, appointed by the Governor or any other official authorized under 
State law to make such appointments, composed of individuals involved in 
or concerned with the education of handicapped children, including handi-
capped individuals, teachers, parents or guardians of handicapped chil-
dren, State and local education officials, and administrators of programs 
for handicapped children, which (A) advises the State educational agency 
of unmet needs within the State in the education of handicapped children, 
[and] (B) comments publicly on any rules or regulations proposed for issu-
ance by the State regarding the education of handicapped children." 
§ 1413(a)(12). 
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VI 
Applying these principles to the facts of this case, we con-
clude that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the deci-
sion of the District Court. Neither the District Court nor 
the Court of Appeals found that petitioners had failed to com-
ply with the procedures of the Act, and the findings of nei-
ther court would support a conclusion that Amy's educational 
program failed to comply with the substantive requirements 
of the Act. On the contrary, the District Court found that 
the "evidence firmly establishes that Amy is receiving an 'ad-
equate' education, since she performs better than t~ aver-
age child in her _cl~ss andis aav~ncmg easiTy from grade to 
grade." 483 F. Supp., at 534. In light of this finding, the 
lower courts should not have concluded that the Act requires 
services beyond those provided by the Furnace Woods school 
administrators. Accordingly, the decision of the Court of 
Appeals is reversed and the case is remanded for further pro-
ceedings consistent with this opinion. 30 
So ordered. 
30 Because the District Court declined to reach respondents' contention 
that petitioners had failed to comply with the Act's procedural require-
ments in developing Amy's IEP, 483 F. Supp. , at 533, n. 8, the case must 
be remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
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Memorandum to Justice Powell 
Re: Rowley 
I am sympathetic with your general reaction that Justice 
Rehnquist reaches the correct result in this case, but by means of a 
standard that may not be appropriate for other cases. Your concur-
ring draft, however, does raise two questions in my mind. 
1 
First, is the standard used by the DC impossibly incorrect? 
On reflection, I wonder if it really is. "An opportunity to achive 
full potential commensurate with the opportunity provided to other 
children" focuses first on a child's potential, not on an absolute 
level of performance.. For a person like Nicholaus Romeo, "full po-
tential" has an extremely 1 imi ted meaning. Sad to say, Romeo's 
"full potential" may mean only the ability to perform extremely sim-
ple tasks. For others with less severe handicaps, "full potential" 
increases -- although by definition it remains less than that pos-
sessed by individuals without handicaps. Consequently, a standard 
based on "potential" is tied to the individual's own characteristics 
-----------------~, and not any particular absolute level of performance. This is a 
very desirable attribute for a standard that must apply across a 
very wide range of abilities. 
Moreover, the DC's "full potential" standard is qualified. 
...... ___..; 
It applies only to the extent "commensurate with the opportunity 
provided to other children." Plainly public schools often fail to 
1~ 
/ 2. 
educate normal children to 100% of their full potential. The "com-
mensurate" clause properly should ensure that handicapped children 
get no greater claim to realization of their potential. This "com-
mensurate" standard -- correctly applied -- could provide the cru-
cial sensitivity to educational cost that the Act needs in order to 
be administrable on a sensible basis. 
In sum, I have serious doubts whether the DC' s standard 
really is misconceived. It seems to me to offer a promising ap-
preach to an otherwise intractable statute. 
I do think that the application of this standard in the DC 
and the CA2 is incorrect. As WHR sets forth at 6-7 of his draft, 
the school district undertook substantial efforts to assist Amy's 
education. But the courts below faulted the school because Amy was 
not "'learning as much • . as she would without her handicap.'" 
Dr aft at 8 (quat ing DC opinion) . Well, of course not! It often 
will take incredible resources in effect to remove a child's handi-
cap. Often (as with Romeo) it is just plain impossible. If this is 
to be the test, the school board will always lose (or go broke). 
Instead, I think a proper application of the "potential" 
standard must recognize that the performance to be expected from any 
child depends on the extent of his or her handicap. The more severe 
the handicap, the lower (unfortunately) the child's potential --and 
the less the absolute benefit that the child can fairly be expected 
to gain from education. In this case, I would hold that the school 
district had done as much to help Amy to achieve her (limited) po-
tential as it had to help children with better hearing to achieve 
3. 
their (higher) potential. Therefore I would hold that the school 
district properly had discharged its duties under the Act. 
2 
My second question concerns the extent of proper deference 
to school planning under the Act. Every instinct counsels against 
the involvement of federal judges in an area so much within the 
sphere of school board expertise as the proper curriculum for handi-
capped students. Yet it seems to me that the terms of the Act sug- ~ 
gest that Congress mandated such involvement -- on a nondeferential 
basis. The Act does provide that the records of the school board's 
deliberations could be introduced before the district court. But it 
added that the court "shall hear additional evidence at the request 
of a party " The standard of review deliberately is speci-
fied as the more intrusive "preponderance" standard. And the feder-
al courts are instructed to "grant such relief as the court deter-
mines is appropriate." I question how easily the plain language of 
this statute can be read to mandate a "high degree of deference" to 
state officials, no matter how desirable such deference might be as 
a matter of sound policy. 
* * * * * 
I have spoken with HAB' s clerk on this case. HAB tenta-
tively voted to reverse in this case, and apparently is planning to 
circulate comments or a concurrence in a few days. One option for 
you would be to await his comments to see if they cast any light on 
the resolution of this difficult case. I would be happy to try to 
develop any thoughts expressed here if you think they hold promise. 
r ' 
4. 
Or you may decide I'm all wet. It won't be the first time I've been 
caught in a rain storm! 
May 18, 1982 
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Justice Powell concurring. 
I join the Court's opinion, recognizing that - at 
least for me it is virtually impossible to derive a 
satisfactory standard from the statutory definition of 10 
"free appropriate public education". 
The Court concludes that handicapped children must 
receive "some" or "sufficient" educational benefits to 
satisfy the requirements of the Act. See, ante, 23, 24, 
et seq. This level of generality affords little guidance. 15 
The basic difficulty as the Court observes, is that 
participating states are required to educate each 
handicapped child ranging from the marginally hearing-
impaired to the profoundly retarded. And each child's 
needs must be assessed individually. Therefore it simply 20 
is not possible to frame a standard except in the most 
2. 
general terms. Nevertheless, the District Court held, and 
a divided panel of the Court of Appeals agreed, that the 
term "free appropriate public education" requires a state 
to provide for each handicapped child "an opportunity to 25 
achieve [her] full potential commensurate with the 
opportunity provided to other children." 483 F. Supp. at 
534. This standard is wholly unrealistic and could not 
have been intended by Congress. 
to create such an educational opportunity for each 30 
handicapped child, regardless of the nature or degree of 
the handicap. And how can school authorities compare - in 
any objective way - the "full potential" for education of 
each handicapped child with that of "other children"? 
The Court is wise, I think, to limit the application 35 
of its standard to the facts of this case. The important 
contribution of today's opinion is its identification of 
the scope of a reviewing court's inquiry in suits brought 
under Section 1415(e) (2) of the Act. Such a court first 
must determine whether the state has complied with the 40 
rather elaborate procedures, including parental 
involvement, required by the Act. Secondly, in light of 
3 0 
the facts before it, the Court must determine whether the 
"individualized educational program" (the IEP) developed 
for that child is "reasonably calculated to enable the 45 
child to receive educational benefits". Ante at 29. In a 
case like Amy's, this inquiry certainly is satisfied when 
the child is receiving passing marks and is advancing from 
~' grade to grade. N 26, p. 29. 
~ 
50 
When it is shown that the school authorities have 
developed an individualized educational program in 
accordance with the requirements of the Act, a reviewing 
court should accord a high degree of deference to the 
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Judge Mansfield, in a full and documented dissent with 
which I largely agree, observed that this formulation is 
"unfeasible and imposes a standard that is impractical, if 5 
not impossible, to use as a means of evaluating the 
appropriateness of a handicapped child's education." Pet. 
A-18.* 
10 
* Judge Mansfield commented that the district court had 
I 
"indulged in understatement" when it recognized the 15 · 
difficulties in applying its own standard: 
"The difficulty with the standard, of 
course is that it depends on a number of 
different measurements which are difficult to 
make. It requires that the potential of the 
handicapped child be measured and compared to 
his or her performance, and that the resulting 
differential or 'shortfall' be compared to the 




As the Court's opinion makes clear, Congress 
recognized the inherent difficulty of a precise definition 
or standard when it used the term "free appropriate public 
education", delegating broad authority in this respect to 30 
state educational authorities. It therefore becomes 
necessary, as the the Court does in this case, to consider 
the facts of each case in 1 igh t of the Congressional 
purpose. The Act, pSrticul~ Section 1415e ( 2) ' 
~~1-D~ 
authorizes judicial review and ReY;f additional evidence at 35 
the request of a party. Moreover, a reviewing court may 
grant such relief as it determines to be "appropriate". 
Although this is a broad grant of judicial review, the 
history and structure of the Act - as well as common sense 
- counsel that a high level of deference be accorded an 40 
individualized educational program developed by school 
authorities pursuant to the prescribed procedures. 
Congress could not have contemplated that federal judges 
should be free to substitute their views for those of duly 
constituted educational authorites where it is clear - as 45 -
in this case - that the responsibile education authorities 
have addressed Amy's needs with sympathy, care and 
diligence. 
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Justice Powell concurring. 
The Court has set forth the relevant provisions of 5 
the Education for All Handicapped Children Act. It 
requires, to qualify for federal assistance, that a state 
provide for all handicapped children a "free appropriate 
public education." 20 u.s.c. §1412(1) This term is 
defined only in §1401(18) of the Act as follows: 
(18) The term "free appropriate public 
education" means special education and related 
services which (A) have been provided at public 
expense, under public supervision and direction, 
and without charge, (B) meet the standards of 
the State educational agency, (C) include an 
appropriate preschool, elementary, or secondary 
school education in the State involved, and (D) 
are provided in conformity with the 
individualized education program required under 
section 1414(a) (5) of this title. 
Section 1414 (n) (5) requires that at the beginning of each 




established or revised for each handicapped child. The 25 
other requirements of §1401 (18) - proporting to include 
the elements of the required "appropriate" education, 
present no problem in this case. The two questions 
presented are the meaning of a "free appropriate public 
,&. • 
education", and the role of a court in exercising the 30 
review granted by §1414 of the Act. 
The courts below concluded it was necessary to give 
some more specific guidance - than the provisions of the 
Act itself - as to the meaning of "free appropriate public 
education". The District Court, and a divided panel of 35 
the Court of Appeals, concluded that a state is required 
to provide for each handicapped child "an opportunity to 
achieve [her] full potential commensurate with the 
opportunity provided to other children." 483 F. Supp. at 
534. Judge Mansfield, dissenting from the majority in the 40 
Court of Appeals, observed that this definition is 
"unfeasible and imposes a standard that is impractical, if 
not impossible, to use as a means of evaluating the 
appropriateness of a handicapped child's education". 
Petition A-18. I agree with Judge Mansfield that the 45 
formulation approved below is at least as vague and 
uninformative as the language of the Act. This Court also 
has under taken, in its opinion today, to ascertain what 
Congress meant by an "appropriate" education for each 
handicapped child. It agrees that the definition or 50 
standard articulated by the courts below is "unworkable 
requiring impossible measurements and comparsions." 
Ante at 21. The Court then states its own view: 
"Implicit in the congressional purpose of 
providing access to a 'free appropriate public 
edcation' is the requirement that the education 
to which access is provided be sufficient to 
confer some educational benefit upon the 
handicapped child". Ante at 23. 
The Court recognizes that determining "when" a child 
is receiving "sufficient educational benefits" presents a 
more difficult problem. It correctly emphasizes that a 
state is required "to educate a wide-spectrum of 
55 
60 
handicapped children, from the marginally hearing-impaired 65 
to the profoundly retarded and palsied. It is clear that 
the benefits obtainable by children at one end of the 
spectrum will differ dramatically from those obtainable by 
children at the other end, with infinite variations in 
between." Ante at 24. The Court then holds that the 70 
congressional requirement is satisfied when a state 
provides "personalized instruction with sufficient support 
services to permit the child to benefit educationally from 
that instruction." Ante at 25. Again, the Court 
reiterates a standard of "some educational benefit". 75 
4. 
In my opinion Congress did not attempt to define 
"free appropraite public education" more precisely than it 
did simply because there is no satisfactory definition. 
In view of the almost infinite variety of the degree of 
handicaps and needs for assistance of handicapped 80 
children, no definition could afford genuinely helpful 
guidance to the educational authorities responsible for 
implementing the Act or to courts authorized to review the 
individualized programs established for particular 
children. It is impossible for this Act to operate in any 85 
sensible way except by reliance primarily on the judgment 
and expertise of the duly constituted educational 
authorities. These are the boards, committees and 
individuals responsbile under state and local law for 
educating all children, and despite the extraordinary 90 
detail of this legislation one must assume that Congress 
did not undertake to substitute its judgment - or the 
judgment of a court - for the excercise of discretion by 
the school personnel who must deal with the problems and 
needs of tens of thousands of handicapped children on a 9 5 
day to day basis. This is not to say that the Act is 
Jo 
standard less. It is explicitly clear that under the 
definitionable section, §1414 {a) {5), that the required 
individualized educational program must include special 
education and related services; these must meet the 100 
standards of the state educational agency; and they must 
include "appropriate preschool, elementary, or secondary 
school education". 
I note that the term "appropriate" appears in the 
definitionable section as well as in the language that 105 
section undertakes to define. Cf. §1412{1) and 
1414 {a) {5). I conclude, therefore, that we need not go 
beyond the word "appropriate". It affords no less 
guidance than "reasonable", a term familiar to 
legislators, administrators, boards and agencies as 110 
well as courts. I think we create confusion by trying to 
read more into "appropriate" than we do into "reasonable", 
a term confronted almost daily by courts. No public 
school system can operate under this Act unless 
"appropriate" is viewed as a standard of reasonableness 115 
under ·the circumstances pertaining to the particular child 
at the time the individualized program is designed or 
o. 
annually reviewed. The broad grant of judicial review is 
to assure, primarily, that the state and local educational 
authorities comply strictly with the prescribed 120 
procedures. Although judicial review is expressed 
broadly, including the right of a party to introduce 
"additional evidence", a reviewing court should give a 
high degreee of deference to the determination of the 
educational authorities as to the appropriateness of the 125 
program established for the child. It is unthinkable that 
Congress intended for a judge and both state and 
federal courts have jurisdiction - to be free to second 
guess the duly constituted authorities. A reviewing court 
is required to base its decision on "the preponderance of 130 
the evidence" in granting "such relief as as 
appropriate", in weighing the evidence there should be a 
strong presumption of the appropriateness of the action 
taken by the school authorities. 
I join the Court's judgment but not its opinion. 135 
' :; 
CHAMBERS OF" 
.JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL 
~uprttttt <!Jcud cf tq t ~t~ ~taits 
'ltlasirtngtcn. ~. <!f. 20~>!~ 
June 2, 1982 
/ 
Re: No. 80-1002 - Bd.of Ed. of the Hendrick Hudson 
Central School District v. Roxley 
Dear Byron: 




cc: The Conference 
lfp/ss 06/02/82 Rider A, p. 4 (Rowley) 
ROWLEY4 SALLY-POW 
I do not think "some educational benefit" 
affords any more specific guidance than "appropriate 
public education". Each is a general standard that 
necessarily leaves to the educational authorities, after 
they have otherwise complied with the Act, the 
determination of the individualized programs. I see no 
need, therefore, for any different or additional standard 
from the statutory language itself. 
In emphasizing that a considerable discretion 
necessarily must be left to the educational authorities, I 
do not suggest that the Act be viewed as providing no 
mandatory guidance. It is clear, particularly under 
§§1401(18) and 1414(a) (5), that the required 
2. 
individualized educational program must include special 
education and related services; these must meet the 
standards of the state educational agency; these must be 
approved by the Department of Education (John: is this 
correct?); and the state standards must include 
"appropriate preschool, elementary, or secondary school 
education. It is to be noted that the term "appropriate" 
thus appear in both §§1401 (18) and 1414 (a) (5). I 
therefore conclude that we need not go beyond the word 
"appropriate" in attempting - by judicial decision to lay 
down a more specific standard. The key word "appropriate" 
affords no less guidance than "reasonable", a term 
familiar to legislators, administrators, boards and 
agencies - as well as courts. Indeed, I think we would 
create confusion by trying to read more into "appropriate" 
3. 
than we do into "reasonable". No public school system 
could operate intelligently under this Act unless the 
requirement of an appropriate public education be viewed 
essentially as a standard of reasonableness in light of 
the purposes and other requirements of this legislation. 
In a school system of any size, there will be hundreds of 
hand~capped children - each with his or her own 
capabilities and needs. In establishing, and revising 
annually, an individualized program for each child, a 
considerable measure of discretion is essential. 
I turn now to the question of judicial review. 
r.•!hether wisely or not, the Act confers a broad right of 
judicial review - available, in effect, to the parent or 
guardian of any handicapped child. The complaining party 
has a right to introduce "additional evidence", and a 
4 • 
court must base its decision on "the preponderance of the 
evidence", and may grant "such relief as ••. is 
appropriate". Note again the use of the term appropriate. 
I agree with the Court, however, that the expert judgment 
of the educational authorities as to program that is 
appropriate for a particular child must be given a high 
degree of deference by a court. In weighing the entire 
record, a presumption of appropriateness must be accorded 
the action of the school authorities. Congress could not 
have intended otherwise. 
I join the Court's judgment, but no so much of 
its opinion as undertakes to formulate a standard 
different from that contained in the Act itself. 
lfp/ss 06/02/82 Rider A, p. 1 (Rowley) 
ROWl SALLY-POW 
For me, the relevant questions in this case are (i) 
whether we must undertake - as the courts below did - to 
formulate some more specific standard than the statutory 
term "appropriate public education", and (ii) the degree 
of deference that a reviewing court must accord the action 
of the school authorities in establishing a particular 
individualized education program. 
ROW4 GINA-POW 
June 3, 1982 
80-1002 Board of Education v. Rowley 
Justice Powell concurring. 
The Education for All Handicapped Children Act requires a 5 
participating state to provide for all handicapped 
children a "free appropriate public education." 20 u.s.c. 
§1412(1} This term is defined in §1401(18} of the Act as 
follows: 
(18} The term "free appropriate public 
education" means special education and related 
services which (A} have been provided at public 
expense, under public supervision and direction, 
and without charge, (B) meet the standards of 
the State educational agency, (C) include an 
appropriate preschool, elementary, or secondary 
school education in . the State involved, and (D) 
are provided in conformity with the 
individualized education program required under 
section 1414(a} (5} of this title. 
Section 1414(n} (5} requires that, at the beginning of each 
school year, "an individualized educational program" be 




other requirements of §1401 (18} - proporting to include 25 
the elements of an "appropriate" education, present no 
problem in this case. For me, the relevant questions in 
this case are (i} whether we must undertake - as the 
courts below did to formulate some more specific 
' < 
standard than the statutory term "appropriate public 30 
education", and (ii) the degree of deference that a 
reviewing court must accord the action of the school 
authorities in establishing a particular individualized 
education program.~ The courts below concluded it was 
necessary to give more specific guidance than the 
provisions of the Act itself - as to the meaning of "free 
appropriate public education". The District Court, and a 
divided panel of the Court of Appeals, concluded that a 
state is required to provide for each handicapped child 
"an opportunity to achieve [her] full potential 
commensurate with the opportunity provided to other 
children." 483 F. Supp. at 534. Judge Mansfield, 
dissenting, observed that this definition is "unfeasible 
and imposes a standard that is impractical, if not 
impossible, to use as a means of evaluating the 
appropriateness of a handicapped child's education". 
Petition A-18. I agree with Judge Mansfield that the 
standard approved below would confuse, rather than afford 




This Court also has undertaken, in its opinion today, 50 
to state what Congress meant by an "appropriate" education 
for each handicapped child. It agrees that the definition 
or standard articulated by the courts below is "unworkable 
.••• requiring impossible measurements and comparsions." 
Ante at 21. The Court then states its own view: 
"Implicit in the congressional purpose of 
providing access to a 'free appropriate public 
edcation' is the requirement that the education 
to which access is provided be sufficient to 
confer some educational benefit upon the 
handicapped child". Ante at 23. {Emphasis 
added) 
The Court correctly emphasizes that a state is 
55 
60 
required "to educate a wide-spectrum of handicapped 65 
children, from the marginally hearing-impaired to the 
"profoundly retarded and palsied". It is clear that the 
benefits obtainable by children at one end of the spectrum 
will differ dramatically from those obtainable by children 
at the other end, with "infinite variations in between." 70 
Ante at 24. The Court then holds that the Act's 
requirement is satisfied when a state provides 
"personalized instruction with sufficient support services 
to permit the child to benefit educationally from that 
instruction." Ante at 25. Again, the Court reiterates a 75 
standard of "some educational benefit". 
I do not think "some educational benefit" affords any 
more and probably less specific guidance than 
"appropriate public education". Each is a general 
standard that necessarily leaves to the educational 80 
authorities, after they have complied otherwise with the 
Act, the determination of the individualized programs. I 
see no need for any different or additional standard from 
the statutory language itself. 
This leaves a considerable discretion to the 85 
educational authorities, but only in the area where 
discretion is necessary. The Act provides quite specific 
guidance in other respects. It is clear, particularly 
under §§1401 (18) and 1414 (a) (5), that the required 
individualized educational program must include special 90 
education and related services: these must meet the 
standards of the state educational agency: the state 
standards must include "appropriate preschool, elementary, 
or secondary school education": and the state's overall 
plan must be approved by the Department of Education 95 
(John: is this correct?) It is to be noted that the term 
"appropriate" appear in both §§1401 (18) and 1414 (a) (5). 
I therefore conclude that we need not go beyond the 
word "appropriate" in attempting - by judicial decision -
to lay down a more specific standard. The key word 100 
"appropriate" affords no less guidance than "reasonable", 
a term familiar to legislators, administrators, boards and 
agencies - as well as courts. Indeed, I think we would 
create confusion by trying to read more into "appropriate" 
than we do into "reasonable". No public school sys tern 105 
could operate intelligently under this Act unless the 
requirement of an appropriate public education be viewed 
essentially as a standard of reasonableness in light of 
the purposes and other requirements of this legislation. 
In a school system of any size, there will be hundreds of 110 
handicapped children each with his or her own 
capabilities and needs. In establishing, and revising 
annually, an individualized program for each child, a 
considerable measure of discretion is simply essential. 
I turn now to the question of judicial review. 115 
Whether wisely or not, the Act confers a broad right of 
judicial review - available, in effect, to the parent or 
guardian of any handicapped child. The complaining party 
has a right to introduce · "additional evidence", and a 
court must base its decision on "the preponderance of the 120 
evidence", and may grant "such relief as is 
appropriate". Note again the use of the term appropriate. 
I agree with this Court, however, that the expert judgment 
of the educational authorities as to the program that is 
appropriate for a particular child must be given a high 125 
degree of deference by a court. In weighing the entire 
record, a presumption of appropriateness must be accorded 
the action of the school authorities. Congress could not 
have intended otherwise. 
I join Parts I, II and IVB of the Court's opinion, 130 
and the judgment. 
ROW4 GINA-POW Jzd~~~ 
June 3, 1982 q.~ J' ~ 
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80-1002 Boar of E ucat1on v. Rowley 
~~ 
Justice Powell concurring.  
1/ The Education for All Handicapped Children Act ::~r~ 
~#~1-~ . 
participating state to provide for all handicapped 
children a "free appropriate public education." 20 u.s.c. 
§1412(1) This term is defined in §1401(18) of the Act as 
follows: 
(18) The term "free appropriate public 
education" means special education and related 
services which (A) have been provided at public 
expense, under public supervision and direction, 
and without charge, (B) meet the standards of 
the State educational agency, (C) include an 
appropriate preschool, elementary, or secondary 
school education in the State involved, and (D) 
are provided in conformity with the 
individualized education program required under 
section 1414(a) (5) of this title. 
-
Section 1414 (n) (5) requires ~~, at the beginning of each 
school year, individualized educational program" be 
established or revised for each handicapped child. The 
other requirements of §1401 (18) - proporting to include 
1\ 
--.-
the elements of an "appropriate" educati~ present no 
problem in this case. For me, the relevant questions in 
this case are (i) whether we must undertake - as the 








standard than the statutory term "appropriate public 30 
education", and {ii) the degree of deference that a 
reviewing court must accord the action of the school 
authorities in establishing a particular individualized 
education program. ~ The courts below concluded it was 
necessary to give more specific guidance than the 
provisions of the Act itself - as to the meaning of "free 
appropriate public education". The District Court, and a 
divided panel of the Court of Appeals, concluded that a 
state is required to provide for each handicapped child 
"an opportunity to achieve [her] full potential 
commensurate with the opportunity provided to other 
children." 483 F. Supp. at 534. Judge Mansfield, 
dissenting, observed that this definition is "unfeasible 
and imposes a standard that is impractical, if not 
35 
40 
impossible, as a means 
"! t =. =-4~ 
of e:a i::O: ing ~he 45 
appropriateness of a handicapped child's education". 
Petition A-18. I agree with Judge Mansfield that the 
standard approved below would confuse, rather than afford 
any more definitive guidance than the Act itself. 
This Court also has undertaken, in its opinion today, 50 
3. 
to state what Congress meant by an "appropriate" education 
for each handicapped child. It agrees that the definition 
or standard articulated by the courts below is "unworkable 
requiring impossible measurements and comparsions." 
Ante at 21. The Court then states its own view: 
"Implicit in the congressional purpose of 
providing access to a • free appropriate public 
edcation• is the requirement that the education 
to which access is provided be sufficient to 
confer some educational benefit upon the 
handicapped child". Ante at 23. (Emphasis 
added) 
The Court correctly emphasizes that a state is 
55 
60 
required "to educate a wide-spectrum of handicapped 65 
children, from the marginally hearing-impaired to the 
"profoundly retarded and palsied". It is clear that the 
benefits obtainable by children at one end of the spectrum 
will differ dramatically from those obtainable by children 
at the other end, with "infinite variations in between." 70 
Ante at 24. The Court then holds that the Act's 
requirement is satisfied when a state provides 
"personalized instruction with sufficient support services 
to permit the child to benefit educationally from that 
instruction." Ante at 25. Again, the Court reiterates a 75 
standard of "some educational benefit". 
4 0 
I do not think 11 Some educational benefit 11 affords any 
more and 
~ prebaely less specific guidance than 
11 appropriate public education ... Each is a general 
standard that necessarily leaves to the educational 80 
authorities, after they have complied otherwise with the 
Act, the determination of the individualized programs. I 
~~ 
see no need for any different or additional standardA frQ• 
~~~~~~ 
t.be statutory l:-aRgtte<)e itself. 
1\J 
This leaves a considerable discretion to the 85 
educational authorities, but only in the area where 
discretion is necessary. The Act provides quite specific 
guidance in other respects. It is clear, particularly 
under §§1401(18) and 1414 (a) (5), that the required 
individualized educational program must include special 90 
education and related services; these must meet the 
standards of the state educational agency; the state 
standards must include 11 appropriate preschool, elementary, 
or secondary school education 11 ; and the state's overall 
plan must be approved by the Department of Education 95 
(John: is this correct?) It is to be noted that the term 
11 appropriate 11 appear in both §§1401(18) and 1414(a) (5). 
5. 
I therefore conclude that we need not go beyond the 
word "appropriate" in attempting - by judicial decision -
to lay down a more specific standard. The key word 100 
"appropriate" affords no less guidance than "reasonable", 
a term familiar to legislators, administrators, boards and 
agencies - as well as courts. Indeed, I think we would 
create confusion by trying to read more into "appropriate" 
than we do into "reasonable". No public school system 105 
could operate intelligently under this Act unless the 
requirement of an appropriate public education be viewed 
essentially as a standard of reasonableness in light of 
the purposes and other requirements of this legislation. 
In a school system of any size, there will be hundreds of 110 
handicapped children each with his or her own 
capabilities and needs. In establishing, and revising 
annually, an individualized program for each child, a 
considerable measure of discretion is simply essential. 
I turn now to the question of judicial review. 115 
Whether wisely or not, the Act confers a broad right of 
judicial review - available, in effect, to the parent or 
guardian of any handicapped child. The complaining party 
6. 
has a right to introduce "additional evidence", and a 
court must base its decision on "the preponderance of the 120 
evidence", and may grant "such relief as is 
appropriate". Note again the use of the term appropriate. 
I agree with this Court, however, that the expert judgment 
of the educational authorities as to the program that is 
appropriate for a particular child must be given a high 125 
tL~~~Ar~~~ 
degree of deference by a court. In weighing the entire 
!\ ~...... '4c c... 
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record, a presumption of appropriateness must be accorded .. ag, &F-,.,. .,.., ;:;j 
the action of the school authorities. 
have intended otherwise. 
Congress could n~
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I join Parts I, II and IVB of the Court's opinion
and the judgment. 
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June 3, 1982 
RE: No. 80-1002 Board of Education, etc. v. Roxley 
Dear Byron: 
P1eas.e join me. 
Justice White 
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CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
June 4, 1982 
Re: 80-1002 - Board of Education v. Rowley 
Dear Bill: 
Please join me. 
Respectfully , 
Justice Rehnquist 
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June 7, 1982 
Re: 80-1002 - Board of Education of the Hendrick 









80-1002 Board of Education v. Rowley 
Memo to file: 
Although I would prefer to write this case along 
the lines of my draft opinion of June 3 (see draft in file) , 
WHR - after he and I talked - has made helpful changes in 
his opinion. See drafts Nos. 2 and 3. 
I am not sure Bill can obtain a Court without my 
vote. Therefore, in the interest of putting a Court 
together, I am joining his opinion. 
L.F.P., Jr. 
ss 
.June 9, 198 2 
80-1002 Board of Education v. Rowley 
Dear Bill: 
Please ;oin me. 
Justice Rehnquist 
lfp/ss 
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